



# FORMATION AND GROWTH OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY

---

( *Azad Hind Fauj* )

*Editor Incharge*  
DURLAB SINGH

*Being the inner story of the formation and growth of the Azad Hind Fauj, as revealed from the Special Orders of the Day issued from time to time by The Supreme Commander, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, the Diary of Captain Shah Nawaz and Sahgal, the correspondence between Netaji and Lieut. Dhillon, the military charge sheet against the three officers and other exhibits produced by the prosecution in the historic I.N.A. Trial.*



1946

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## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

No issue has for the past fifteen years compelled such wide attention of the people of this country as the Trial of the three I. N. A. Officers held in the famous Red Fort of Delhi. Ever since Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru raised his voice for their release or at least for a mild treatment for the brave men and officers who fought gallantly in the battlefields of Burma and Malaya, in the plains of Imphal and on the Arakan front, their marvellous deeds of bravery, their heroic achievements and their unique spirit of self sacrifice and discipline have become a subject of discussion and active interest for every Indian, to whatever caste or creed he belongs.

What were the circumstances that led to the formation of the Indian National Army, what were the chief factors that contributed to its growth, what are the main achievements and failures of I. N. A. and what spirit way working behind them is proposed to be set forth in the I. N. A. SERIES of HERO PUBLICATIONS.

The present volume is the first of that series and is a true reproduction of all the exhibits produced by the prosecution in the Trial of Captain Shah Nawaz, Captain Prem Kumar Sahgal, and Captain S. Gurbax Singh Dhillon. It is an interesting set of important documents and throws a flood of light on the various activities of the Azad Hind Fauj and consequently on the formation and growth of the National Army.

DURLAB SINGH.

## NETAJI

As promised in one of the editions of The Rebel President, I have the honour to convey it to my readers that the second part of the biography of Shyt. Subhas Chandra Bose captioned Netaji is almost ready and the manuscript has been handed over to the printers. It will include all the activities of this valiant fighter of India's freedom since the time of his escape down to the Trial of the I. N. A. Officers held in the historic Red Fort of Delhi.

The period between the year 1942 and 1945 is one of the greatest importance in the history of Indian Politics. There was struggle within the country during these years and also outside it. Subhas Bose conducted the fight outside India in his own way when in India the Indian National Congress had launched a furious struggle to achieve independence from the foreign yoke.

What course did the Indian Struggle take after the exit of Shyt. Subhas Chandra Bose from the scene of Indian Politics ; what is the extent of hardships, miseries, starvation and sufferings that the people of India had to face during these years ? How did Subhas Bose manage to escape from this country and what is the account of

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his activities in Germany, Japan and other countries ; Was he a Puppet or a Patriot ; was he a Criminal or a Crusader; was he a Traitor or a True servant of the nation has been comprehensively dealt in the pages of this book.

Since a very limited number of copies will be published, the readers are advised to book their orders immediately with the publishers or with their dealers in order to avoid disappointment.

Lahore

18th December, 1945.

DURLAB SINGH.

AUTHOR OF

"The Rebel President."

# THE REBEL PRESIDENT

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Late Sir P. C. Ray.

by Durlab Singh

*Foreword* by Sardul Singh Caveeshar.

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# PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL IDEALS OF SUBHAS BOSE

“ IS HE A FASCIST ? ”

Subhas Bose's political views have given rise to fierce controversy. Ever since his escape from India he is said to have become a votary of fascism and a 'Lawrence of Arabia' for the Axis war mongers to stir up trouble in this country.

Is he a Fascist ? This small book is an attempt at answering this question. His political philosophy has been subjected to an analysis, and his change of views has been traced to his European visit in 1933. It reveals the background of the mind of the great Indian Leader and consequently throws a flood of light on the political belief to which he subscribes.

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## CHARGE SHEET.

The Accused No 1 C 58 Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan 1/14 Punjab Regiment, No. 1 C 226, Capt. P. K. Sahgal 2/10 Balauch Regiment, and No. 1 C 336 Lieut. Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon 1/14 Punjab Regiment, all attached C. S. D. I. C. (1), Delhi, Indian Commissioned officers, are charged with :—

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, waging war against the King, contrary to Section 1st. Charge. I. A. A. Sec. 41. 121, of the Indian Penal Code.  
(against all three accused jointly).

—in that they together—

at Singapore, in Malaya, at Rangoon, in the vicinity of Popa, in the vicinity of Kyankpadaung, and else where in Burma, between the month of September 1942 and the 26th day of April, 1945, did wage war against His Majesty the King Emperor of India.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Murder contrary to Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.  
2nd Charge. I. A. A. Sec. 41.  
(against the said Lt. Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon alone).

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or about 6th March 1945, by causing the death of Hari Singh, did commit murder.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Abetment, contrary to Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.  
3rd Charge. I. A. A. Sec. 41  
(against the said Capt. P. K. Sahgal alone).

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill, on or about 6th March, 1945, did abet the offence of the murder of Hari Singh as specified in the 2nd. Charge hereof, which offence was committed in consequence of such abetment.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Murder  
contrary to Section 302 of the Indian  
Penal Code.

4th Charge.  
I. A. A. Section  
41 (against Lt.  
Gurbakhsh Singh  
Dhillon alone).

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or  
about 6th March, 1945, by causing the  
death of Duli Chand, did commit murder.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Abetment,  
contrary to Section 109, of the Indian  
Penal Code, of an offence punishable under  
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

5th Charge.  
I. A. A. Section  
41. (against the  
said Capt. P.K.  
Sabgal alone).

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill, on or about 6th  
March, 1945, did abet the offence of the murder of Duli  
Chand as specified in the 4th charge hereof, which  
offence was committed in consequence of such abetment.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Murder,  
contrary to Section 302 of the Indian  
Penal Code.

6th Charge.  
I. A. A. Section  
41 (against the  
said Lt. Gur-  
bakhsh Singh  
Dhillon alone).

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or  
about 6th March, 1945, by causing the  
death of Daryao Singh, did commit  
murder.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Abetment,  
contrary to Section 109 of the Indian  
Penal Code, of an offence punishable  
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal  
Code

7th Charge.  
I. A. A. Section  
41. (against the  
said Capt. P. K.  
Sabgal alone).

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill, on or about 6th March 1945  
did abet the offence of the murder of Daryao Singh as  
specified in the 6th charge hereof, which offence was  
committed in consequence of such abetment.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Murder,  
contrary to Section 302 of the Indian  
Penal Code.

8th Charge.  
I. A. A. Section  
41 (against the  
said Capt. P. K.  
Sahgal alone.)

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or  
about 6th March, 1945, by causing the  
death of Dharam Singh, did commit murder.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Abetment,  
contrary to Section 109 of the Indian  
Penal Code, of an offence punishable under  
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,

9th Charge.  
I. A. A. Section  
41. (against the  
said Capt. P. K.  
Sahgal alone.)

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill, on or about 6th  
March, 1945, did abet the offence of the murder of Dharam  
Singh as specified in the 8th charge hereof, which offence  
was committed in consequence of such abetment.

Committing a Civil offence, that is to say, Abetment,  
contrary to Section 109 of the Indian  
Penal Code, of an offence punishable under  
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,

10th Charge,  
I. A. A. Section  
41. (against the  
said Capt. Shah  
Nawaz Khan  
alone).

—in that he—

at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or  
about 29th March, 1945, did abet the  
murder by one Khazin Shah and one Aya Singh of gunner  
Mohammad Hussain of H.K.S. R.A., which offence was  
committed in consequence of such abetment.

(Sd.) —

Place—Delhi.

Col.,

Comdg.,

Dated 17th September, 1945.

C.S.D.I.C. (1)  
Delhi.

To

Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan  
Capt. P.K. Sahgal and  
Lt. Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon

C.S.D.I.C. (1) Delhi.

**In the matter of a General Court Martial:**

Take notice under Indian Army Act Rule 121, that at your trial by Court Martial the Prosecutor intends to call the following witnesses whose evidence is not contained in the Summary of Evidence, viz. :—

1. No. 50097 Sepoy Jagiri Ram, I. A. M. C.
2. No. 12242 Sepoy Allah Ditta, 5/7 Rajput.
3. No. 8528 Jem. Mohamad Hyat, I Bahawalpur Inf.
4. Lt. Abdul Qadir Shah, "
5. No. S. R. 763013 Sub. Ram Sarup, R. I. A. S. C.
6. No. 923429 Sepoy Sardar Mohammad, R.I.A.S.C.
7. No. 39742 Gur Puran Singh, 22 Mtn. Regt.
8. No. 38394 Hav. Mohammad Sarwar, "
9. No. 33707 L/Nk Mohammad Khan, M. A. T. C.
10. No. 9319 Cook. Dadu Khan, I. G. S. C.
11. No. M. E. 30615 L/Nk Mohinder Singh, I. E. M. E.
12. No. 36773 Sepoy Sadhu Singh, 22 Mtn. Regt.

A copy of the statement of each of the above-named witnesses is hereto attached.

Dated this 17th. day of September, 1945.

(Sd.) \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col.

A. G.'s Branch (Prosecution Sect.)

G. H. Q. (1)

Prosecutor.

Served a true copy of this notice and attached statements on each of the afore-mentioned Capt. Shah Nawaz

Khan, Capt. P. K. Sahgal and Lt. Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon on the 17th day of September 1945.

(Sd.) —

Lt. Col.

Prosecutor.

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**Exhibit A.**

Indian National Army.

Special Order No. 1. dated 1st. September 1942.

by

Captain Mohan Singh, G. O. C., Indian National Army.

**PROMOTION :**

The G. O. C. is pleased to promote the following to the rank of 2/ Liet. in the I. N. A., w. e. f. 1st. September 1942.

Name.	Old rank and Unit.
Shah Nawaz Khan	Capt. 1/14 Punjab.
P. K. Sahgal	Capt. 2/10 Baluch
Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon,	Capt. 1/14 Punjab.
Babu Ram	Sub. Maj 1/14 Punjab.
D. C. Nag.	Lt. P. W. Cage.

(Sd.) M. Z. Kiani. Maj.,

'G' H. Q., I. N. A.

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**Exhibit B.**

Indian National Army.

Special order No. 4. dated 9th September 1942

General Mohan Singh, General Officer Commanding Indian National Army.

## PROMOTIONS :

The G. O. C., Indian National Army is pleased to make the following promotions in the I. N. A., subject to the approval of the President, Council of Action, Indian Independence League :—

To be Majors with effect from 10th September, 1942 :—

- 4. 2/Lt. Shah Nawaz Khan.
- 9. 2/Lt. P. K. Sahgal.
- 13. 2/Lt. G. S. Dhillon.
- 38. 2/Lt. D. C. Nag.
- 41. 2/Lt. Babu Ram.

(Sd.) M. Z. Kiani, 2/Col.,  
C. G. S., H. Qrs. I. N. A.

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### Indian National Army.

Special Order No. 12, dated the 15th October, 1942.

General Mohan Singh, G. O. C., Indian National Army.

## PROMOTIONS :

The G. O. C., I. N. A., is pleased to make the following promotions in the I. N. A., subject to the approval of President, Council of Action, Indian Independence League.

Name and Rank.	Unit.
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To be Lt. Colonels with effect from 15th October, 1942 :—

Major Shah Nawaz Khan.	H. Q. I. N. A.
------------------------	----------------

To be Majors w. e. f., October 1942.

Capt. P. K. Sahgal	H. Q. 1: Hind Field Force Group.
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Capt. Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon, Reinforcement.

(Sd.) M. Z. Kiani, Lt. Col.,

Chief of the General Staff, H. Q., I. N. A.

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### Exhibit C.

#### Indian National Army

Special order No. 12, dated the 15th October, 1942.

General Mohan Singh, G. O. C., Indian National Army.

#### PROMOTIONS :

The G. O. C., I. N. A., is pleased to make the following promotions in the I. N. A., subject to the approval of President, Council of Action, Indian Independence League.

Name and Rank.

Unit.

To be Lt. Colonels with effect from 15th October, 1942 :—

Major Shah Nawaz Khan

H. Q., I. N. A.

To be Major w. e. f., October, 1942.

Capt. P. K. Sabgal.

H. Q. 1. Hind Field.  
Force Group.

Capt. Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon, Reinforcements.

(Sd.) M. Z. Kiani, Lt. Col.,

Chief of the General Staff, H. Q., I. N. A.

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### Exhibit K.

#### WHIPPING :

55. The Court may by its sentence order with or without rigorous imprisonment whipping according to the



following scale, provided the accused is certified to be in a fit condition :—

- (a) Six stripes a week or less.
- (b) Total stripes not to exceed 24.
- (c) At an interval to be ordered by the Court.

### Exhibit K. I.

Draft amendment to I. N. A., Act.

### CHAPTER IV.

#### Summary Powers :

In Section 9, after Item 4, insert the following :—

5. Army	Sepoys.	R. I. upto 160 days (6
Commander.	N. C. Os.	months). Reduction to
		any rank with or with-
		out R. I. upto 60 days.
	Officers up to	Reduction to next lower
	the rank of	rank or, severe reprim-
	Major.	and, or reprimand
		only if the accused officer
		elects to be tried by him
		summarily rather than
		by a Court Martial.

Solitary confinement upto 15 days to officers excluding field officers, subject to the scale laid down in Section 54 of the Act.

In addition he may order forfeiture of pay of all ranks for a period not exceeding 30 days.

#### CORPORAL PUNISHMENT :

In serious cases of indiscipline, amongst sepoy and N. C. Os., he may also order flogging not exceeding 3 strokes per week upto 3 weeks, subject to the provisions laid down in Section 55 of the Act.

6. Director of Sepoys.  
Military Bureau. N. C. Os.

R. I. upto 9 months Reduction to any lower rank with or without R. I. upto 90 days.

officers  
including Field  
officers.

Reduction to next lower rank or severe reprimand or reprimand.

Solitary confinement upto one month to officers including Field officers subject to the scale laid down in Section 54 of the Act.

In addition, he may order forfeiture of pay of all ranks for a period not exceeding 60 days.

Corporal Punishment :

In serious cases of indiscipline amongst sepoy and N. C. Os., he may also order flogging not exceeding 3 strokes per week upto 4 weeks, subject to the provisions laid down in Section 55 of the Act.

#### 7. Detachment Commanders.

(a) Officer Commanding. Powers of a Regiment or Group Commander as in Sub-Section (4) of this Section.

(b) Officer Commanding 200 or more but less than 500 strong. Powers of a Field officer as in Sub-Section (3) of this Section.

(c) Officer Commanding 50 or more but less than 200 strong. Powers of a Commanding officer as in Sub-Section (2) of this Section.

(d) Officer Commanding less than 50 strong. Powers of an officer as in Sub-Section (1) of this Section.

(e) N. C. Os. Commanding detachment. Confinement to lines upto 7 days or in case of guards picquets or fatigue an extra upto 7.

When higher punishment is called for, he will send the accused to the nearest unit or detachment commanded by an officer.

When a Detachment Commander considers that a lower punishment than that he is empowered to award, is sufficient to meet the ends of justice he may use his discretion in awarding a lower punishment in any particular case, under Section 50 of the Act. Such punishments are:—

1. Confinement to lines upto 28 days.
2. Extra Guards, picquets or fatigue upto 7.

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#### Exhibit L.

Military Bureau Gazette.

No. A/4.

Serial No. 8.

Dated. 17th April, 1943.

### Absorptions.

1. Officers shown in the attached list No. 2 are absorbed in the I. N. A., subject to the approval of the President, Council of Action, I. I. L., with effect from 1st April, 1943.  
Serial No. 9.

### Appointments.

2. Appointments of officers as per annexures (a), (b), (c) and (d) to this order, are made in the I. N. A., subject to the approval of the President, Council of Action, I.I.L.  
Serial No. 11.

### POSTINGS AND TRANSFERS.


The following postings and transfers are made :—

Rank	Name	From	To	w.e.f.
		(Sd.)	P. K. Sahgal, Major,	
			Military Secretary.	



Annexure (b) To Military Bureau Gazette, Serial No. 9 (2), dated 17th April, 1943.  
 Lt. Col. M. Z. Kiani, Army Commander.

A. D. C.  
 Lt. Abdul Majid, Personal Clerk.  
 H. Qrs. I. N. A.



**Annexure (c) To Military Bureau Gazette Serial No. 9 (2), dated 17th April, 1943.**  
**Guerrilla Regiments.**

Gandhi Grla. Regt.		Azad Grla Regt.		Nehru Grla Regt.	
Comd. Lt.-Col. I. J. Kiani, 2-in C. Maj.		Comd. Maj. Gulzara Singh 2-in-C. Maj.		Comd. Lt.-Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan, 2-in-C.	
Thakar Singh Adj.		A. I. S. Dera, Adj.		Maj. Bishan Singh, Adj.	
Q. M. 2/Lt. Mohammad Raza.		Q. M. 2/Lt. Imam-ud-Din, Int. Offr.		2/Lt. Mohd Hayat, Q.M.	
Sappar Officer. Lt. Pritam Singh.		Hav. Darshan Singh.		Lt. Fazal Qadir Qureshi.	
Liaison Offr. Int. Officer Lt. Chanan Singh.		Sapper Offr. 2/Lt Masta, Liaison off 2/Lt. Kishori Lal.		Sapper Offr. 2/Lt. Shiv Rao Devikar.	
I Grla Bn. II Grla Bn. III Grla Bn. IV Grla Bn. V. Grla Bn. VI Gr. Bn.		Capt. P. J. Singh.		Int. Offr. 2/Lt. Yaspal Singh Liaison offr.	
Maj. Thakar Capt. M.A.K. Maj. Pritam Lewis.		Capt. Ram Lt. Jodh Singh (Temp).		VII Grla Bn. VIII Grla Bn. IX Grla Bn.	
Singh. Ranan.		Lt. Hari Singh Lt. Chander Capt. Padam Singh.		(Temp).	
Intelligence Group.		Bahadur Group.		Comdt. Lt.-Col. Burhan-ud-Din.	
Comd. Maj. S. A. Malik.		Staff Offr.		Adjut.	
Staff Offr. Lt. Harnam Singh.		H. M. Lieut. Gurbachan Singh		Coy. Comds. Capt. M. M. Khurana.	
Adjut.		Q. M. 2/Lt. Atma Singh.			
Interpreter 2/Lt. T. S. Wasan.		Hav. C. Basu.			
2/Lt. S. K. Banerjee.		Sappar Offr. 2/Lt. Mohammad Afzal.			

Annexure (d) Military Bureau Gazette Serial No. 9 (2), dated 17th April, 1948.

*I Hind Field Force Group.*

Comd. --- Lt.-Col. S. M. Hussain.

G. 1. --- Major J. W. Rodrigues.

G. 2. --- 2/Lt. Khushal Singh.

Adjnt. --- Capt. B. S. Rawat.

Asstt. --- Adjnt. Lt. Allahyar Khan.

Q. M. --- Capt. M. G. Chhibar.

Sappar Offr. S. O. Ibrahim.

Liaison Offr.

2/Lt. Khushi Ram.)

Ord. Offr.)

Inf. Bn. Lt.	II Inf. Bn.	III Inf. Bn	A. F. V. Bn.	Hy. Gun. Bn.	Eng. Coy.	Tpt. Coy.	Lt. Sig. Coy.
Mir Rahman	2/Lt. Dhanna	Capt. B. S.	Maj. Mohd.	Capt. Mumtaz	Lt. N. R.	Dyanu Rao	2/Lt.
Khan (Temp.)	Singh (Temp.)	Negi.	Riaz Khan.	Khan.	Shindhu.	Jadha.	Shadhu Singh.



Exhibit M.

*Indian National Army Orders.*

by

*General Mohan Singh*

*General Officer Commanding, Indian National Army*

Syonan To Monday 30th, November, 1942.

Military Secretary's Branch.

PART B.

APPOINTMENTS.

58. The G. O. C., I. N. A. is pleased to make the following appointments in the Indian National Army :—

Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan	To be O. C. Cadets
Reinforcement G. P.	Trg. School, w.e.f.
	26th Nov., 1942.

POSTINGS AND TRANSFERS.

59. The following postings and transfers are made :—

Rank.	Name.	From Unit.	To Unit.	w.e.f.
Lt. Col.	Shah Khan Nawaz	Reinforcement H. Q.		
				26-11-1942.

G. P.	I. N. A.
	Cadets Trg.
	School.

(Sd.) N. S. Bhagat

Lt. Col.,

Military Secretary, I. N. A.

## Exhibit N.

### Military Bureau Gazette

No. A/3.

Dated 10th April, 1943.

Serial No. 7. The following postings and transfers are made :—

Rank	Name	From	To	w. e. f.
Major	P. K. Sahgal	H. Q. 1.	D. M. B's	26-2-1943
			Hind F. F. Gp. office	

Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan.	Reinf.	"	"
	Gp.		

(Sd.) P. K. Sahgal,

Bidadari,

Major,

10th April, 1943.

Military Secretary.

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## Exhibit P.

*Special order of the Day*

by

Subhash Chandra Bose, Supreme Commander

Azad Hind Fauj.

(Indian National Army).

In the interests of the Indian Independence Movement and of the Azad Hind Fauj, I have taken over the direct Command of our Army from this day.

This is for me a matter of joy and pride because for an Indian, there can be no greater honour than to the Commander of India's Army of Liberation. But I am conscious of the magnitude of the task that I have undertaken and I feel weighed down with a sense of responsi-

bility. I pray that God may give me the necessary strength to fulfill my duty to Indians, under all circumstances, however, difficult or trying they may be.

I regard myself as the servant of 38 crores of my country men, who profess different religious faiths. I am determined to discharge my duties in such a manner that the interests of these 38 crores may be safe in my hands and every single Indian will have reason to put complete trust in me. It is only on the basis of undiluted nationalism and of perfect justice and impartiality that India's Army of Liberation can be built up.

In the coming struggle for the emancipation of our motherland, for the establishment of a Government of free India, based on the good will of 38 crores of Indians and for creation of a permanent army which will guarantee Indian Independence for all times, the Azad Hind Fauj has a vital role to play. To fulfil this role, we must weld ourselves into an army that will have only one goal, namely the freedom of Indians and only one will namely to do or die in the cause of India's freedom. When we stand, the Azad Hind Fauj has to be like a wall of granite ; when we march the Azad Hind Fauj has to be like a steam-roller.

Our task is not an easy one ; the war will be long and hard, but I have complete faith in the justice and in the invincibility of our cause. 38 crores of human beings who form about one-fifth of the human race, have a right to be free and they are now prepared to pay the price of

freedom. There is consequently no power on earth that can deprive us of our birth right of liberty any longer.

Comrades 'officers and men' ! With your unstinted support and unflinching loyalty Azad Hind Fauj will become the instrument of India's Liberation. Ultimate Victory will certainly be ours, I assure you. Our work has already begun.

With the slogan, 'Onward to Delhi' on our lips, let us continue to labour and to fight till our National Flag flies over the Viceroy's House in New Delhi, and the Azad Hind Fauj holds its Victory parade inside the ancient red fortress of the Indian Metropolis.

	(Sd.) Subhas Chandra Bose,
General H. Q.	Supreme Commander.
Indian National Army.	(Sipah Salar).
25th August, 2603.	

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Exhibit ' Q. '

III. Hq. from No. R.—1.

*Enrolment Form of Civil Volunteers for the  
Azad Hind Fauj, (I. N. A.)*

You are warned that if after enrolment it is found that you have given a false answer to any of the following questions, you will be punished in accordance with the Law laid down by the I. I. L.

1. Name. (in Block letters.)

2. Address.

(a) In India.

(b) In East Asia.

(i) Village.

(i) Post office.

(ii) Post office.

(ii) City or Town.

(iii) Thana.

(iii) District.

(iv) Tahsil.

(iv) Kanpong or Estate.

(v) District.

(v) Country.

(vi) Province.

3. Age.

4. What are your qualifications :—

(a) Educational.

(b) Linguistic.

(c) Technical.

5. Are you married or single.

If married, where is your family now? Number of children alive.

6. Have you ever been imprisoned by the Civil power (what for).

7. How employed at present.

8. Have you ever served in the Army? If so, for how long and in what capacity.

9. Are you willing to go and serve wherever the I. I. L. orders you, whether in the I. N. A. or in any other capacity.

I. ....solemnly declare that the above answers made by me to the above questions are true and that I am willing to sign the attached pledge.

*Certificate of enrolling officer.*

I certify that the answers to the above questions were given and recorded by me (or in my presence) at the—day of—26——.

Signature of Enrolling Officer.

*Description on Enrolment (See instructions below).*

To be completed by R. O. or (Local Chairman, or Secretary of the League).

Age	Years.	Chest.	Minimum	Inch.
Height.	Ft. Inch.	Measurement	Max	Inch.

To be completed by Medical Officer.

I consider him.....for the Army. (Insert here 'fit or unfit'). Identification marks.

Date.

Place.

Medical Officer.

Note—(a) General Health must be above average, should have no disability which is likely to interfere with the Military duties.

(b) Men who have no family encumbrance here will be preferred.

(c) Men who can read and write at least in their mother tongue would be preferred.

*Pledge.*

1. I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will join and enlist myself in the Civil Volunteers Organisation of the Indian Independence League.

2. I solemnly and sincerely dedicate myself to India and hereby pledge my life for her Freedom. I will serve

India and the Indian Independence Movement to my fullest capacity even at the risk of my life.

3. In serving the country, I shall seek no personal advantage for myself.

4. I will regard all Indians as my brothers and sisters without distinction of religion, language or territory.

5. I will faithfully and without hesitation obey and carry out all orders and instructions given to me by the Indian Independence League and I will carry out all just and lawful commands of my superior officers under whom I may be required to serve from time to time.

Date—26.....

Place.

Signature.

### Exhibit W.

#### *Special Order of the Day.*

Comrades of Azad Hind Fauj.

In the middle of March this year, Advanced units of the Azad Hind Fauj, fighting shoulder to shoulder with their valiant allies, the Imperial Nippon Forces, crossed the Indo-Burma border and the fight for India's liberation thereupon commenced on Indian soil.

The British authorities, by ruthlessly exploiting India for over a century and bringing foreign soldiers to fight their battles for them, had managed to put up a mighty force against us. After crossing the Indo-Burma border, our Forces inspired by the righteousness of our

cause, encountered these numerically superior and better equipped but heterogenous and disunited forces of the enemy and defeated them in every battle.

Our units, with their better training and discipline and unshakable determination to do or die on the path of India's Freedom, soon established their superiority over the enemy, whose morale deteriorated with each defeat.

Fighting under the most trying conditions, our officers and men displayed such courage and heroism that they have earned the praise of every body. With their blood and sacrifice, these heroes have established traditions which the future soldiers of Free India shall have to uphold.

All preparations had been completed and the stage had been set for the final assault on Imphal, when torrential rains overtook us and to carry Imphal by an assault was rendered a tactical impossibility.

Handicapped by the elements, we were forced to postpone our offensive. After the postponements of the offensive, it was found disadvantageous for our troops to continue to hold the line that we then had. For securing a more favourable defensive position, it was considered advisable to withdraw our troops. In accordance with this decision, our troops have withdrawn to a more favourable defensive position. We shall now utilise the period in full in completing our preparations, so that with the advent of better weather, we may be in a position to resume our offensive.



Having beaten the enemy once in several sectors of the front, our faith in our final victory and in the destruction of the Anglo-American forces of aggression has increased tenfold. As soon as all our preparations are complete, we shall launch a mighty offensive against our enemies once again. With the superior fighting qualities, dauntless courage and unshakable devotion to duty of our officers and men, victory shall surely be ours.

May the souls of those heroes, who have fallen in this campaign inspire us to still nobler deeds of heroism and bravery in the next phase of India's War of Liberation.

Burma.

14th August, 1944.

Jai Hind.

(Sd.) Subhas Chandra Bose,  
Supreme Commander.

Azad Hind Fauj.

Exhibit 'X'

*Azad Hind Fauj Orders.*

Lt. Col. Habib-ur-Rahman, Asstt. Chief of Staff.

No. 13 Unit.

*Burma*

Dated 5. 9. 1944.

*Congratulatory.*

334. His Excellency Thakin Nu. Burmese, Minister of Foreign Affairs sent the following message of felicitations to H. E. Netaji, Subhas Chandra Bose, on the 7th July, 1944, on the occasion of the celebrations of Netaji week.

Events of momentous significance have so crowded upon one another ever since your Excellency have ably assumed leadership of the Indian Independence League, on July 4, 1943, that it is hardly credible that a year has gone by. The transfer, not long afterwards of your Provisional Government from Synon to Burma, the front line country of the present war of greater East Asia, was a happy augury, not only for India and Burma, but also for the whole of East Asia, and your Excellency has never been known to have paused for rest.

This unabating energy has been a source of inspiration to all the rank and file of the I. N. A., as well as the Rani of Jhansi Regiment, whose fighting strength and spirit are growing from day to day. The spectacular success of the past year of your Excellency's countrymen are attributable to your Excellency's indomitable will to achieve freedom at all cost and implicit faith in East Asia's Ultimate Victory.—

*Reply by His Excellency Netaji.*

*Subhas Chandra Bose.*

Your Excellency,

Allow me to express on behalf of Provisional Government of Azad Hind, the I. N. A., the Rani of Jhansi Regiment and myself, my most sincere thanks to your Excellency for your kind message of felicitations of July 7th.

I am thankful to the Government and the people of Independent Burma for their good wishes in our fight for independence.

I wish also to assure your Excellency that the Provisional Government of Azad Hind and the three Million Indians in East Asia deeply appreciate the whole-hearted sympathy and co-operation of the Government and People of Burma, particularly, since the Provisional Government shifted its H. Q. from Shonan to Burma. It is this aid of the Government and People of Burma that has rendered it possible the I. N. A. to reach the Indo-Burma Frontier and carry on its successful operation against the Anglo-Americans in India.

It is most gratifying to me to know that at this moment troops of the I. N. A. are fighting shoulder to shoulder with their comrades of the Burmese Army against the common enemies, the Anglo-Americans and for a common cause, namely, the freedom of Asia, the freedom of Burma, and the freedom of India.

Assuring your Excellency of my highest consideration.

*Communique issued by the Provisional Government of Azad Hind on July 27, 1944.*

On receipt of information re : the formation of a new cabinet with General Koise as Premier, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the State, Provisional Government of Azad Hind cabled congratulations and felicitations to General Koise and other Ministers of his Cabinet, and

assured them of the determination of Indians in East Asia to continue to fight shoulder to shoulder with Nippon until Victory is achieved.

His Excellency Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the State, Provisional Government of Azad Hind and Supreme Commander of the Azad Hind Fauj sent the following message of felicitations to His Excellency Naing-gandaw Adipadi. Dr. Baw-Maw, Head of the State, Independent Burma, on the occasion of the Anniversary of Burma's Independence.

I wish to take this opportunity to express the heartiest thanks of Provisional Government of Free India, the Indian National Army and of myself to your Excellency to the Government and to the people of Independent Burma for all the valuable help that has been and is being rendered to us in our fight for Independence of India.

I wish also to assure your Excellency that we, Indians, are irrevocably resolved to fight shoulder to shoulder with Independent Burma and Nippon under all circumstances, until our common enemies are crushed and our common victory is achieved.

---

*Netaji's Message to Nipponese Foreign Minister.*

Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose has sent the following message to His Excellency Mamoru Shingamitsu, Foreign Minister of Nippon :—

On the occasion of your Excellency's assuring once again the office of Foreign Minister and concurrently,

the Minister of greater East Asiatic Affairs; I desire to offer my heartiest felicitation. Having had the highest admiration of your Excellency's statesmanship and diplomacy, it gives me a unique pleasure to see your Excellency back in office.

I take this opportunity of assuring your Excellency once again that inspite of the hard times that lie ahead of us, we shall go on fighting shoulder to shoulder with Nippon under all circumstances, until our common victory is achieved.

*His Excellency Mamoru Shingamitsu has sent the following reply to Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose.*

I wish to express my sincere thanks to your Excellency for your kind message of felicitations, I welcome your assurance of wholehearted co-operation at this momentous juncture.

I am firmly convinced that we shall win our common cause, and that under your Excellency's wise and able leadership, the struggle for liberating India will ultimately be crowned with success. All my best wishes."

The following telegrams were recently exchanged between His Excellency Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the State, Provisional Government of Azad Hind and His Excellency Kovit Abhaiwongse, Prime Minister of Thailand.

*Netaji's Telegram*

On behalf of all freedom loving Indians, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, the Indian National

Army, the Indian Independence League and myself, I wish to offer my hearty congratulations on the occasion of your Excellency assuming the office of Prime Minister. I wish to take this opportunity to assure your Excellency that we, Indians, will continue whole-heartedly to co-operate with the Government and the people of Thailand in our common fight against the common enemy. I hope and trust that during your Excellency's tenure of office the cultural and political ties that have already been formed between Thailand and Free India will be further strengthened. Heartily wishing your Excellency all success as the leader of the Thai Nation and assuring your Excellency of my highest consideration—Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the State, Provisional Government of Azad Hind."

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*His Excellency Major Abhaiwongse's Reply.*

I thank you sincerely for your congratulatory telegram. The Government and people of Thailand fully sympathise with the high aspirations of the freedom loving Indians and will continue to give whole-hearted support to the Indian Independence Movement. I desire to assure your Excellency that I shall use my constant effort further to enhance the cultural and political ties between Thailand and Free India. In the name of the Thai people, I wish every success for the I. N. A. and for your Excellency's noble undertaking. May the Independence

of India soon be achieved. I avail myself of this opportunity of assuring your Excellency of my highest consideration.

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*Decorations A. H. F. Personnel.*

335. The following will be the order of precedence for Decorations awarded to members of the Azad Hind Fauj by the Provisional Government of Azad Hind :—

1. Shaheed-e-Bharat.
2. Sher-e-Hind.
3. Sardar-e-Jang.
4. Vic-o-Hind.
5. Tamgha-e-Bahaduri.
6. Tamgha-e-Shatrunchash.

II. In future there will be two classes of the 'Sardar-e-Jang Medal according to the standard of individual bravery, devotion to duty and leadership exhibited in the field.

The awards of "Sardar-e-Jang" Medal made up-till now will be of Class I of that medal.

III. Members of the Azad Hind, who render meritorious and commendable service in the field, but fall short of qualifying for a decoration, will be granted the certificate "Sanad-e-Bahaduri," by the Head of the State, Provisional Government of Azad Hind.

The award of Tamgha-e-Shatrunchash is of the following classes :—

Class II : to be awarded to those members of the Azad Hind Fauj who kill or capture alive any British or American officer or other rank either in single combat or in a group fight where qualities of individual initiative and individual bravery come into play.

Class I : to be awarded to those members of the Azad Hind Fauj who exhibit conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in killing or capturing alive any British or American officer or other rank either in single combat or in a group fighting where qualities of individual initiative and individual bravery come into play.

---

*Precedence, etc.*

The Medal 'Tamgha-e-Nash' shall take precedence after 'Tamgha-e-Bahaduri.' This medal may be awarded to a member of the Azad Hind Fauj in addition to any other decoration for which he may have qualified.

"Tamgha-e-Shatrurnash" may also be awarded posthumously.

The Provisional Government of Azad Hind has decided that the Medal "Tamgha-e-Shatrurnash" may be awarded to any person other than a member of the Azad Hind Fauj, whether outside India or inside, who, while participating in or helping the war of India's Liberation, qualifies himself for the decoration by fulfilling the conditions laid down above.



This medal may also be awarded to any person outside India or inside—who help the prosecution of India's War of Liberation by killing or capturing alive any British or American, other than Army Personnel, who is clearly an enemy in the path of India's freedom.

---

Exhibit "Y"

*Azad Hind Fauj Orders.*

by

*Lieut. Colonel Aziz Ahmad Khan.*

No. 11. Unit.

*Burma*

Dated 30th October, 1944.

Appointments-officers :

During the absence of the Supreme Commander, A.H.F., from H. Q. No. 11. Unit, Lieut. Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan will deal with all routine and urgent matters, which would ordinarily have been dealt with by the Supreme Commander.

Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan will, during this period, exercise the powers of the Chief of Staff.

*War Council :*

445. Since the establishment of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind on the 21st October, 1943, a year of intensive activity has elapsed. In the meantime, the war has reached a stage when the initiative is going to pass from the hands of our enemies to those of our friends and of our Allies. To prepare for the coming offensive, it is

absolutely necessary to make an all out effort at Total Mobilisation and to further intensify and co-ordinate all our activities connected with our war-preparations. In order to achieve this objective, a special organ of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind has to be set up. The War Council of the Provisional Government has, therefore, been formed. The War Council which is the supreme organ of the Provisional Government for directing and controlling the war effort and the war preparations of the Government will have the following duties :

1. To further intensify the war activities of the Provisional Government.

2. To initiate any new activities that will be found necessary for the war effort and for war preparations.

3. To co-ordinate all these activities with a view to producing the maximum result, namely, to launch the offensive that will bring about the speedy and complete over-throw of our enemies.

The following is the composition of the War Council :—

1. Colonel I. K. Bhonsla,
2. Colonel M. Z. Kiani,
3. Lt. Col. Ehsan Qadir,
4. Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan,
5. Lt. Col. Habib-ur-Rehman,
6. Lt. Col. Gulzara Singh,
7. Sri. N. Raghavan,

8. Sri. S. A. Ayer,
9. Sri. Parmanand,
10. Col. A. C. Chatterji, Secretary,
11. Sri. A. Yellappa, co-opted member,

(Sd.) D. C. Nag.

Major

" A "

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Exhibit 'C C'

Security

*Special order of the day.*

To

All officers and men of the Azad Hind Army.

Comrades,

As you all know, the positive achievements of the officers and men of the Azad Hind Fauj last year on the field of battle and the victories that they scored over the enemy through their patriotism, bravery and self-sacrifice, were marred to some extent by the cowardice and treachery of a few officers and men. We were hoping that with the advent of the New year

all traces of cowardice and treachery would be wiped out, and that in this year's operations the Azad Hind Fauj would be able to put up an unsullied record of heroism and self-sacrifice. But that was not to be. The recent treachery of five officers of the H. Q. of the 2nd. Division has come as an eye opener to us that all is not well within our ranks and that the seeds of cowardice and treachery have yet to be wiped out. If we now succeed in exterminating cowardice and treachery once for all, this shameful and despicable incident may, through God's grace, ultimately prove to be a blessing in-disguise. I am, therefore, determined to take all possible measures necessary for the purification of our Army. I am confident that in this I shall have your full and unstinted support.

In order to destroy completely the germs of cowardice and treachery, the following measures will have to be adopted :—

1. Every member of the Azad Hind Fauj, officer, N.C.O. or Sepoy will, in future, be entitled to arrest any other member of the Azad Hind Fauj, no matter what his rank may be, if he behaves in a cowardly manner or to shoot him if he acts in a treacherous manner.

2. I am giving an opportunity to all members of the Azad Hind Fauj who may not feel inclined to work dutifully or fight courageously in future to leave

the rank of the Azad Hind Fauj. This offer will be open for one week from the time of its communication.

3. In addition to giving an opportunity to unwilling elements to leave voluntarily the ranks of the Azad Hind Fauj, I want to carry out thorough purge of our army. During the course of this purge, all those will be removed against whom there is suspicion that they may fail us, or betray us, at the critical moment. In order to carry out this purge successfully I want your fullest co-operation and I want you, therefore, give to me and my trusted officers all available information about any cowardly or treacherous elements that may still exist in our Army.

4. It will not be enough to carry out a thorough purge now. In future, also, vigilance will have to continue. It will, therefore, be the duty of every member of the Azad Hind Fauj, in future, to keep his eyes and ears open in order to detect in good time any tendency towards cowardice or treachery. In future if any member of the Azad Hind Fauj detects any tendency towards cowardice or treachery, he should report at once, either orally or in writing either to me or to the officers who may be within reach. In other words, from now onwards and for all times, every member of the Azad Hind Fauj should regard himself as the custodian of the honour and reputation of the Azad Hind Fauj and of the Indian Nation.

5. After purge has been carried out and unwilling elements have been given an opportunity of leaving our Army, if there is any case of cowardice or treachery, the punishment will be death.

6. In order to create within our army a moral bulwark against cowardice and treachery, we have to create an intense hatred against cowardice and treachery in any form. A strong feeling has to be created in the mind of every member of this army that for a member of a revolutionary army, there is no crime more heinous and despicable than to be a coward or a traitor. Instructions are being issued separately as to how we can create such an intense hatred against cowardice and treachery so that there will be no more cowards or traitors within our ranks.

7. After the purge has been carried out, every member of the Azad Hind Fauj will be required to renew his oath to fight on bravely and courageously until the emancipation of our dear motherland is achieved. Instructions regarding the form and manner of this oath will be issued separately.

8. Special rewards will be given to those who give information regarding cowardly and treacherous elements or who arrest or shoot at the front cowardly and treacherous elements.

Burma,  
Dated 13th March, 1945.

(Sd.) Subhas Chandra Bose,  
Supreme Commander,  
Azad Hind Fauj.

## Exhibit 'DD'

Security.

*Special order of the day.*

To

*All officers and men of the Azad Hind Fauj.*

Comrades,

In order to express our indignation, disgust and hatred against cowardice and treachery, a special observance will be held in every camp of the Azad Hind Fauj, on a day to be previously fixed for the purpose. All officers and other ranks must take part in the observance.

With regard to the details of the observance, each camp will be free to draw up its own programme with a view to making the observance a complete success. Directions in broad outlines are, however, being given herewith.

(a) Poems or articles may be written and read, expressing hatred and disgust against cowardice and treachery.

(b) Dramas may be improvised and acted for expressing abhorrence against cowardice and treachery.

(c) Effigies of the traitors (Riaz, Madan, Sarwary, Day, Mohammad Bakhsh and others) in cardboard or straw or clay or any other suitable material, either in human or in animal form, should be prepared and every member of the camp should give full vent to his disgust and hatred against the traitors.

(d) Lectures should be delivered praising Indian heroes of the past and lauding the brave deeds of the members of the Azad Hind Fauj in the course of the present War of Liberation.

(e) The day's observance should end with the singing of National Anthem and collective shouting of slogans.

Special reward will be given to the camp that can put up the best show.

Burma  
13. 3. 1945.

(Sd.) Subhas Chandra Bose,  
Supreme Commander,  
Azad Hind Fauj.

Exhibit "EE"

No. 107/1/2/G.

Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.,  
Syonan, 22nd March 1943.

To

H. Qrs., I. N. A.,  
Bidadari.

Sub.—Policy regarding re-organization of the I. N. A.  
Herewith 2 copies of "policy regarding re-organization of the I. N. A" for necessary action, please.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,  
Lt. Col.,  
C. G. S., Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.

Copy to :—

Iwakuru Kikan (3).



## Policy regarding re-organization of the I. N. A.

1. All the formations in the I. N. A. will first re-organize within themselves.

Units and sub-units will be completed in strength by a process of amalgamation.

Any deficiencies will be made up from the reinforcement camp. These will be demanded as far as possible, as complete units and sub-units.

Say, for instance, after re-organization Ghandi Regt. 4th. Bn., is deficient of three platoons of Sikhs and one section of Jats. Comd. Ghandi Regt. will place his demand on the Army Commander, who will forward it to the D. M. B. who, in turn, will place them on the O. C. reinforcements.

System of going direct and selecting men from the reinforcement camp is strictly forbidden.

2. Reinforcement camp is being formed as soon as circumstances permit. All the volunteers for the I. N. A. from prisoners of war camps in Syonan, and from the main land will be concentrated there and organized on the same basis as the corresponding units of I. N. A.

3. Comd. reinforcement is entirely responsible for organization, training, discipline and administration of all such men under his command.

He will maintain a complete record of each individual coming to his camp, showing the date of joining, original

unit, place from where he came and how finally disposed off.

4. It is notified for the information of all concerned that owing to a very small number of P. M. and Sikh volunteers coming forward to join the I N. A., Jat and Gujjar Companies may have to be accepted in their place.

5. Army Commander is requested to forward to these H. Qrs. deficiencies by Regiments as envisaged by this letter as soon as possible, please.

6. This letter will take effect immediately as no more volunteers are expected to rejoin their units from separation camps.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,

Lieutenant Colonel,

Syonan,

22. 3. 1943.

C. G. S., Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.

Exhibit "F.F"

No. 107/1/6/G.

*Most Secret.*

Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.,

Syonan, 30th March 1943.

To

Headquarters, I. N. A.,

Bidadari.

Designations—Units and Formations.

For the purpose of secrecy, in future, the special service group will be referred to as 'Bahadur Group.' This is not to be published in any of the unit or formation

routine orders, it must be passed down in such a manner that every single soldier will understand the significance of this change.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,

Lt. Col.,

C. G. S., Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.

Copy to:—

Iwakuru Kikan (3)

Exhibit "GG"

No 107/1/U/G.

Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.

Syonan, dated 3rd April, 1943.

Officer Commanding,

Reinforcement Group,

Headquarters, I. N. A.

Bidadari.

Subject.—Re-organization Reinforcement Group.

Ref :—Your No. R/9/9, dated 1st April, 1943.

The procedure outlined in your above-quoted letter will be followed as far as possible. Exceptions of course will have to be made in such cases as men for '*Bahadur*' and '*Intelligence*' groups.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,

Lt. Col.,

C. G. S., Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.

Copy to : —

Headquarters, I. N. A., for information.

Exhibit "HH"

No. 104/5/1/G.

Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.,

Syonan, dated 27th. May, 2603.

To

H. Qrs.

Indian National Army.

Sub :—Policy Regarding the Disposal of category 'B' and 'A'.

Personnel

It has been brought to notice that certain units are indiscriminately sending all their category 'B' and 'C' men to the reinforcement group. In some cases men have been sent only to convalesce there. The Reinforcement Group, as it is to-day, is not in such a fortunate position as to provide any facilities to category 'B' and 'C' men, owing to many difficulties in connection with cooking utensils, accommodation, etc.

Besides this, the I. N. A. is approximately 2000 men under strength, and up to-date it has been found very difficult to fill up this large gap. All units and formation comds. are, therefore, requested to give their best co-operation and support in overcoming this difficulty by;

(a) thoroughly ascertaining each case sent to the Reinforcement group. As far as possible only permanent category 'C' men should be sent ;

(b) making every possible endeavour to bring up temporary category 'B' and 'C' men to a higher class of

fitness, by giving such persons special care, rest and feeding. Unit welfare funds should freely be used for this purpose, and any money spent thus, is certainly well spent.

There is also a likelihood that all category 'B' and 'C' men who cannot be absorbed in the I. N. A., will be reverted to Ps. of war and sent to those camps. It is fully realised that it is a very hard and regrettable decision, nevertheless it may have to be resorted to. The D. M. B. feels confident that the unit and formation comds. will realize that under these circumstances, our moral obligation to our men is to send as few as possible to the Re-inforcements for reversion to Ps. of war.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,

Lt. Col.,

C. G. S., Office of the D. M. B., I. I. L.

Copy to :—

Comd., Re-inforcement Group.

Exhibit 'II'

No. S/10/1/G.

*Most Secret.*

H. Qrs., Supreme Command,

I. N. A.,

Syonan-To, dated 8th. August, 1943.

To

H. Qrs., No. 1. Div., I. N. A.

Comd. Re-inforcement Group.

H. Qrs., Hikari Kikan..

Herewith sent one copy of the "Scheme for the Reception and Management of the Indian Soldiers in Burma."

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,  
Lt. Col ,  
C. G. S., H. Qrs , Supreme Command,  
I. N. A.

Most Secret.

*Scheme for the Reception and management of the Indian  
Soldiers in Burma.*

General :

It is expected that when the operations start on the Indo-Burma border, some Indian soldiers will walk over to our side. Some on the other hand will be forced to surrender during the fight. Due to the difficulties of language, etc., it is very difficult for the Japanese troops in the forward areas to discriminate and handle these men properly. To get best results of our propaganda, we should be very careful in the treatment of these men. Even a small slip costs a lot.

*Object.*—The object of this scheme is to set up a satisfactory system for their :—

1. Reception,
  2. Feeding, Equipment and accommodation,
  3. Mental training and
  4. Organization.
-

(A)

*Reception.*

1. Forward Areas. It is presumed that during operations, the Special Service Group and the Intelligence Group will be working in close liaison with the Japanese troops in the forward areas. It will be a part of their duty to direct these men to the Forward Collecting Post.

(B)

The role of the Reinforcement group.

2. Forward Collecting Post will be manned by a party of the Reinforcement Group. It will be somewhere near the Japanese Regiment H. Qrs. It will be capable of:

- (i) Feeding all the Indian soldiers reaching there.
- (ii) Providing the necessary medical aid and evacuating the severely injured cases to the Advance or Main Collecting Post.
- (iii) Giving encouragement and creating good impression on the newly arrived soldiers.

Suggested Organisation :

Comdr.	...	... 1 Captain or Lieutenant
Assistants	...	... 2 2/Lts.
Provost	...	... 4 Havildars 1, Sepoys 3.
Administrative	...	... 5 Havildar 1.
Staff	...	... Sepoys 4.
Medical Officer	...	... 1 Lt.
Nursing Orderlies	...	... 3.

They will have the necessary medical equipment and the cooking utensils, etc., sufficient to feed at least 100 men at a time.

*Advance Collecting Post :*

This will be located somewhere near the Div. H. Qrs.

*Duties:*

1. Feeding of these men.
2. Further Medical aid to wounded and urgent operations.
3. Immediate transfer of severe cases to the Main Collecting Post.
4. Arranging the despatch of all men to the Main Collecting Station.

*Organization :*

Comdr.	...	... 1 Major or Capt.
Assistants	...	... 3 Cpts.
Provost	...	...20 2/Lts. 1.
		Havildars 2.
		Sepoys 17.
Administrative Staff	...	15 Havildars 2.
		Sepoys 13.
Medical Officer	...	2 Cpts. or Lts.
Nursing Orderlies	...	10.

*Main Collecting Post :*

This will be near Supreme H.Q., I.N.A.

*Duties:*

1. Accommodation of these people.
2. Clothing.



3. Mental training with a view to infuse national spirit.

4. Categorising these men, i.e.

Category 'A.' Those who had no knowledge of the movement and have come with an intention to join us.

Category 'B.' Those who had no knowledge but are willing to join now.

Category 'C.' Those who do not agree to join the National Army.

On receipt of such information from the O.C., Reinforcement, the Supreme H. Qrs. will arrange.

1. To organize arm and equip the men belonging to categories A and B, and
2. To hand over those in category 'C' to the Japanese authorities to be treated as Ps. of War.

#### *Organization:*

1. H. Qrs. Reinforcement Group (Commander Reinforcement Group to command the Main Collecting Post.)

2. Medical (It will be advisable to have this post near Base Hospital).

Medical Officers	...	...	...	3
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Nursing Orderlies	...	...	...	15
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3. Four officers from Enlightenment and Culture Department to be attached for mental and spiritual training.

4. One copy M. P. (If this is not possible the O.C., Reinforcement will use his own men for Police duty. If

necessary, he can ask for duty platoon or Company from other units in the vicinity.

A diagram showing the working of the scheme is attached herewith. The number of posts will depend on the length of the frontline and the line of communication.

Before the scheme can be put into effective operation the Hikari Kikan will kindly ensure that

1. All the Japanese officers and men are familiar with the policy of the Nippon Government towards India, I. N. A. and the Indian soldiers coming to our side.
2. They are ready to help and co-operate with I. N. A. and provide all possible facilities for the smooth running of this scheme.

#### *Transport:*

Generally the Japanese transport coming down and going up the line of communication will be used. Where possible *railway trains* will be used for the despatch of these men to the Advance or the Main Collecting Post.



Exhibit ' JJ '

*Secret.*

No. 107/7/4/G.

Headquarters, H. Qtrs., Supreme Command, I. N. A.  
No. 1. Div., I. N. A. Syonan ; D/. 8th. Sep, 03.

Subject.—Organization—No. 2 M. T. Coy.

The above-mentioned Company will be moving to Burma in the near future to operate as an I. N. A. general duty transport Coy. Its role being the transportation of the I. N. A. personnel, Rations, Supplies, Ordinance and other stores for the I. N. A.

As it will be working for more than one Division of the Azad Hind Fauj, it will be a Central Organization being under the direct command of the Supreme H. Qrs. Since at present only your Division is moving to Burma, this Coy. will be under your command till further orders.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,

Lt. Col.,

C. G. S., H. Qrs., Supreme Command,  
I. N. A.

*Copy to :*

' A/Q ' Supreme Command, I. N. A.

O. C., No. 2 M. T. Coy.

Exhibit ' KK '

*Routine Orders*

by

Capt. D.C. Bhandari—O.C., Details No. 592 Unit A.H.F.

15th March, 1945.

*Burma*

*Administration.*

144. Appointment Officers.

(a) (i) In the absence of Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan, Col. Shah Nawaz Khan will take over temporary Command of No. 502 Unit. This appointment will become effective from the day he takes temporary Comd. of the Unit.

(ii) Consequent to the appointment of Col. Shah Nawaz Khah as Offg. Commander No. 502 Unit. Lt. Col. R. M. Arshad is appointed Offg. Commander No. 152 Unit w. e. f. 21st. February 1945.

(Authority: Draft A. H. F. Gazettee of-6th March, 1945).

(Sd.) D. C. Bhandari, Captain,

O. C. Details No. 502 Unit, A. H. F.

**Exhibit 'LL.'**

*Secret*

*Special Order of the Day*  
by

**COLONEL SHAH NAWAZ KHAN, COMD.**

**NO. 531 UNIT A. H. F.**

**No. 12**

**ADMINISTRATION**

**32. DESERTIONS—CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.**

The following O. RS of No. 252 Unit were charged with the crimes noted below :—

No. 42440	Sepoy	HARI SINGH
" 42570	"	DULI CHAND
" 42537	"	DARYAO SINGH
" 41961	"	DHARAM SINGH.

(i) I. N. A Act, Section No. 35.

## Desertion.

In that, they, while on Active Service, deserted from the front line on 28th February, 1945 until apprehended by the Unit Petrol sent for the purpose on 2nd March 1945.

(ii) I. N. A. Act, Section No. 29 (c)

Directly or indirectly holding correspondence with the enemy.

In that, they, while on Active Service, attempted to communicate with the enemy through a civilian on 28th February 1945.

Under the authority vested in the Commander, No. 2 Division by Supreme Commander A. H. F., vide his letter, dated 21st February 1945, Lieut. Col. P. K. Sehgal, Offg. Comd. No. 531 Unit, passed the sentence of death on 6th March 1945 in the above case.

The sentence of death was carried out at 1900 hours on 6th March 1945.

This order will be read out to all troops.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz, Col.  
Comd. No. 531 Unit, A. H. F.

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Exhibit "MM"

*Secret.*

Copy No. 1.

27th March, 1945.

No. 531 Unit Operation Order No. 2.

*Information.*

(a) *The enemy* : An enemy mechanized column estimated to be approximately one Bde. that infiltrated into *Meiktila* late last month, is still there. It is being reinforced by the enemy who has formed strong bridge-heads at *Nyangu* and *Pakokku*. The strength of the enemy at these bridge-heads is estimated to be approximately 2 Bdes.

It is also learnt that the enemy has recently occupied *Pyinbin* with 10 tanks, 10 armoured cars and approximately, one Bn. of Infantry.

At *Thedaw* approximately 12 miles N. E. of *Pyinbin* enemy's reserves for *Taungtha* front are located. Strong detachment of enemy are also known to be in the vicinity of *Myingyan*, *Taungtha* and *Mahlaing*.

(b) *Own and Allied Troops*. Powerful Japanese forces are fiercely attacking *Meiktila* and have managed to push the enemy out of the town to west side of the lake.

On our front one fresh Heidan has arrived at *Seiktan* 10 miles S. E. of *Pyinbin*.

*Khanjo* units are at *Setsetyo* 4 miles South of *Byinbin*. Further west on *Kayank Bading Nayangu* road, one fresh Bata has taken over the defence of *Taungzin* and *Mayaukye Negalaine* from No. 459 Unit. The advance of *Kantetsu* on both sides of the *Irrawaddy* is progressing satisfactorily.

2. *Intention.* No 531 Unit will attack, co-operation with *Khanjo*, and annihilate the enemy garrison in *Pyinbin* on the night of March 30/31st.

3. *Method.* As a preliminary to the attack Units from their present locations will concentrate in the areas on dates shown below :—

Unit	Place	Date
(a) No. 545 Unit	Seiktein	Night 29/30 March
(b) (i) <i>Khanjo</i> Units	Oyin (2 miles S.E. Byinbin) Taungdaw	Do
	miles South of Byinbin.	
(ii) No. 450 Unit and Cross Roads		
	6 miles Hosokawa Units. S. W. of <i>Pyinbin</i>	Do

On the night 30/31st March *Khanjo* and No. 450 Unit will move forward from their concentration areas and carry out the assault on *Pyinbin* at 0100 hours, annihilate the enemy.

No. 545 Unit will send forward strong detachment to cut off from the East Roads (i) *Pyinbin*—*Tada* (ii) *Pyinbin*—*Thabyewa* (iii) *Pyinbin* *Kama*. These detachments will be in position by 2300 hours on the night 30/31st March.

During the attack on *Pyinbin* by No. 450 Unit and *Khanjo*, No. 545 Unit will step and annihilate any enemy that tries to escape from *Pyinbin* by these Roads and also to stop any reinforcements from coming into *Pyinbin* from East and N. E.



No. 531 Unit Operation Order No. 2.

They will carry sufficient mines to effectively block all roads against enemy tanks.

Heavy artillery will support the attack from the direction of Oyin.

Action after the Attack.

On completion of the attack, all units of No. 531 Unit will fall back on their original starting lines before day-break.

During the day the troops will be well-dispersed and every precaution will be taken against losses from enemy aeroplanes and A.F. V. S.

4. Administration.

Supply routes for units will be as under :—

(a) No. 450 Unit. *Popaywa—Daungie—Cross Roads*  
(S. W. of Pyinbin).

(b) No. 545 Unit—*Popaywa—Seiktein*.

As many bullock carts as are necessary will be commanded locally by units and on termination of the attack will be returned to the owners.

Ration, water and other supplies. All Unit demand will be submitted to D. Q. M. G. Popaywa, who will do his best comply with them. A minimum of seven days dry rations will be dumped in forward areas under unit arrangements.

S. A. A. A very small reserve of 303 S. A. A. Ball is available with D. Q. M. G. Units are requested to exercise utmost economy in the use of ammunition.

A/TK mines. A very limited number are available. These are being sent with trained engineers to assist Units.

Medical. All casualties will be evacuated to Popaywa.

A small quantity of bleaching powder for use in case where water cannot be boiled is being supplied to Units.

Inter-communications :—

No. 450 Unit. No. 531 Units will be by wireless through Hosokawa Unit.

No. 545 Unit—No 531 Unit by wireless.

Battle H. Q. 531 Unit will move from Popaywa to vicinity of Seiktein on night 29/30th March.

Main H. Q. 531 Unit will remain at Popaywa under Command of Major Ram Sarup.

*Special Instructions to Units.*

(1) Attack on Pyinbin is more in the nature of a surprise guerilla raid with the intention of causing as much damage to the enemy as possible and then clearing out of it.

Comds. must use the troops very cautiously and avoid all unnecessary casualties.

(2) Where possible some live prisoners will be brought back.

(3) All papers, other documents and any Unit distinguishing badges found in enemy camp will be brought back.

*Distribution :—*

No. 450 Unit	1	
No. 545 „	1	Shah Nawaz Khan, Colonel.
No. 50 „	1	Commander, No. 531 Unit.
Office Copy	1	

*Acknowledged*

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**Exhibit "NN"**

To

Major Kawabara.

H. O. Division

2nd April 1945.

*Information.*

It has just been learnt by telephonic communications with No. 2 Inf. Regt. that :—

1. The telephone line was cut in 5 places this morning. It has since been repaired.

2. Since early this morning there has been activity of enemy tanks, armoured car and lorry borne troops on Legy front.

One party of enemy approximately 60 in strength came up to approximately 400 meters from Legy. It was fired upon by our men and they have withdrawn. Fresh attack supported by tanks is expected.

3. Early to-day morning, Legy was bombed and machine gunned very intensively by 13 enemy planes. Legy has been burnt. I.N.A. has suffered 6 casualties, one seriously wounded 5 slightly.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan, Col.,

2-4-1945

Exhibit " O O "

*Secret.*

Serial No. 1.

6th April 1945.

Time 12.00.

*Sub :—Tactical.*

Issued in confirmation of verbal orders given to Comds. No. 747. and 801 Units by Comd. No. 599 Unit on 5th April 1945.

Reference : Map Sheet No. 84. O and 84 E

1. In preparation for the offensive role to be taken by the main body of Unit No. 599, the following Tactical moves and reliefs will take place :—

(i) No. 801 Unit will take over Popa defences from INCL Road.

*Kyauk Pading*—Popa to Ind. Road Popa Pyinbin and relieve all troops belonging to 747 Unit by the evening of 6th April.

(ii) No. 801 Unit will take over the defences on Meiktila Kyauk Pading, and relieve all troops belonging to Unit No. 747 by the morning of 8th April.

w. e. f. the evening of 9 April, Unit No. 747 will keep itself in readiness to move out for any offensive role that might be allotted to it.

2. D Q. M. G. Unit No. 599 will endeavour as much as possible to assist units in transportation. Unit Comds. will contact D. Q. M. G. for any M.T. required for advance parties, etc., that may have to go ahead and

arrange for taking over the defences on Kyauk Padang-Meiktila Road.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,  
Colonel,

Comd. No. 599 Unit A.H.F.

Distribution :—

No. 801 Unit

" 747 "

D. Q. M. G.

Hikari Kikan

Office.

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Exhibit " PP "

Unit No. 599      *Operation Order No. 6.      Most Secret.*

Time 1200 hours      Map Sheet No. 84 L      *Copy No. 3.*

and 84 F.      Date April, 1945.

Map Ref. 1 : 250,000

(1) *Information.*

Unit No. 599 has been allotted new role and its responsibility will be as under :—

- (a) Anti Parachute work.
- (b) Guarding the L. O. C.
- (c) Establishing law and orders in areas where I. N. A. troops are stationed.

In connection with para (b) and (c) above, the troops of B. D. A. have rebelled and have formed bands of dacoits, who are looting the villages and also harassing the main L of C of the I. N. A. and the Japanese forces. Our activities will mainly be against them.

(2) *Intention.*

In order to carry out their role, formations of Unit No. 599, will move into the areas as shown below.

- (a) Unit No. 603. In its present area of Magwe-Mainbw. Unit No. 603 on being relieved will rejoin Unit No. 603 at Magwe.
- (b) Unit No. 747. In the area of Natmank-Taungdwingyi.
- (c) Unit No. 801. In the area of Minhala (approximately 15-20 miles S. S. E. of Magwe) to Sinbaungwe.
- (d) H. Q. Unit No. 599 will move to a locality in Magwe area—Exact location will be intimated later.

### 3. *Method.*

- (a) Units will start moving independently from the evening of 10th April 1945. The move will be completed as soon as possible. All units will submit to these H. Qrs. a detailed programme of their move from this station.

#### (b) *Routes.*

- (i) Marching columns of :—

Unit No. 599

Unit No. 801.

will use cart track running through the following villages :—

*Kyauk Padadaung—Ywala—Yezon—Okshilton Wetmaust Mawge.*

- (ii) Unit No. 747 will use cart track :—

*Kyauk Padadaung—Kyaukun—Sangon Magyigon Yamun—Natmauk—Taungdwingyi.*

#### 4. *Administration*

(a) *Tpt.* As far as possible, Units will make their own arrangements for transportation of their heavy baggage party to be left behind with the baggage, which will be transported, if and when the transport is available.

#### (b) *Rations.*

(i) All parties except the unit going to Natmauk will carry enough rations for the journey, plus 3 days reserve.

(ii) Unit bound for Natmauk will carry a minimum of 7 days reserve rations.

All ration that was issued as one month's reserve to units in this area will be returned to D. Q. M. G. Details to Units in this will be issued separately by D. Q. M. G.

As on their charge, units will return exact quantities of Reserve Rations especially rice and salt to the D.Q.M.G.

#### (c) *Medical.*

Medical Air Party Hospital closed here on 9th April 1945, patients and stores will be evacuated in accordance with the instructions issued separately by the A. D. M. S.

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Special instructions in relation to the move of Formations of this Unit No. 599 have been issued separately. These will be strictly complied with.

#### 5. *Information*

Immediately on their arrival at their destinations, all units will submit their *All Correct* (or otherwise) reports to H.Q. Unit No. 599.

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6. *Acknowledge*

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan,  
Colonel,  
Commander No. 599 Unit.

*Distribution :—*

No. 605 Unit  
No. 747 Unit  
No. 801 Unit  
A. D. M. S.  
D. Q. M. G.  
Office.

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Exhibit "QQ"

*Most Secret*

No. A/11/43  
No. 599 Unit A. H. F.  
Burma, 10th April, 1945.

No. 605 Unit A. H. F.

No. 747 Unit A. H. F.

No. 801 Unit A. H. F.

**SUBJECT :—***Special Powers of Summary Punishment For  
Regt. Commanders.*

To fulfil our new role, Regiments will have to be dispersed in very wide areas and communications with the Division H. Qrs. will not be easy.

In order, therefore, to allow the Regimental Commanders to deal firmly and promptly with all situations,



the Div. Comd. on authority from the Supreme Commander, invests all Regimental Commanders with powers to award any punishment including death to any person or persons, guilty of gross indiscipline, disloyalty, desertion or any other serious crime.

In doubtful cases, or in case when a unit is within easy reach of Div. H. Qrs., Divisional Comd. will be consulted, in cases in which death is the sentence.

In all cases where capital punishment has been awarded, a detailed report, in duplicate, will be submitted to these Head Quarters.

(Sd.) Shah Nawaz Khan, Col ;  
Offg. Comd. No. 599 Unit, A. H. F.

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### Exhibit 'RR'

#### *Extract from the Diary of*

Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan (1/14 Punjab Regt.)  
for the year 1944.

January 7—Called on C-in-C Nippon Force.

January 26—Netaji inspected our troops at Field Firing Practice.

Major Ram Sarup posted to my regiment.

January 27—Dinner with Maj. Kinawari 1900 hrs. called on Supreme Comd. Nippon Forces, and received orders for the final move towards India.

February 4—First parties of No. 2 and 3 Bns. moved to Kalewa front.

February 5—Regiment H. Q. moved off from Rangoon at 1800 hrs.

February 9—Three parties of our Regiment have arrived safely.

February 10—More troops have arrived by train without incident. Went to Maymayo with Kimewari and Ram Sarup to call on Japanese G. H. Q. Maymayo :—Stayed the night with Mr. Gopal Singh, President of B. T. C. A simple but very sincere and straightforward man. News of Brilliant activity of the I. N. A. on Arakan Front.

February 11—Called on the G. O. C. North Burma Genl. Moto Cuchi—a great soldier and conqueror of Bukit Tinah Hill. He was very kind and promised full aid to the I. N. A.

February 12—Met Mr. Jamman Khan of Hazro. Taj's relative. Left for Mandalay. Kimewari left for Kalewa by Bus. I could not start owing to car trouble. Addressed the M. T. Coy. They were all in great spirits. Many of them volunteered to go forward with the Regiment. Received Netaji's message of congratulations to I. N. A. troops re. Arakan Operations.

February 20—Went for a run in the morning. Enemy aeroplanes M. Gd. The troops nearby. Hoping to move to Kalewa. The lorry has

not yet returned. News that it has broken down on the way. 20th at 2000 hours. Left Mutaik and arrived at Kalewa Camp. Ram Singh with approximately 500 men left for Falaur. Two Coys. of 3rd Bn. left Mandalay for Pakouk.

March 11—Went to Div. H Q. and met Maj. Fujwara. Very good news. Tiddim with 17 Div. surrounded. Fujwara hopes that by the middle of next month we shall be in the Imphal. Telephones to Thakur to bring 3rd Bn. immediately to Byigon. Hope that we shall be in time to attack Tiddim.

March 12—Three Bn. less 2 Coys at Pakouk has arrived at Kyigow. Went and saw Fujwara again. Move of 3 Bn. to Tiddim is postponed as it has nearly fallen. Have been ordered to take over L of C duty from Yazagyo.—*Myitha Haka*. Kimewari has moved to Haka. I proposed to stay here till I hear more definitely about the role of the Regiment.

March 17—Information received that 200 soldiers from Tiddim are running away and are now at Kalanghkua—west of Talam—approximately 60 miles—ordered Ram Singh there and Sikander to catch them.

Tried Nk. Mangal Singh and two Sepoys

of Parwana Coy. At hours 19.30 a formation at Br. Bombers and fighters 28 in all came and dropped some parachutists in Kalewa area.

March 22—Left post 5 at 0930 hours. On the way to Post 6 heard the news that Awal had captured 22 chin soldiers belonging to Maj. Manning's party. Had lunch at Post 7 and reached Falam at 2000 hours.

March 26—Received Major Thakur Singh's letter. He is very disappointed at the type of work our soldiers have to do and the treatment of Japanese.

March 30—Boobie returned from Kennedy Peak. His report distressing. The Japanese are using I. N. A. Crack Regt. as labourers. I am going to Haka to-day to see Kimewari in this connection. I wonder what is going to be the outcome. Left Falam at 1500 hrs. for Haka. Reached 16 M.S. at 2000 hours. Spent the night at Tao river. Rained all night. No shelter.

April 1st.—Went to inspect post on Klang Klang Rd.

„ 3—Inspected camp-piquets near Haka Sabak and had a frank talk with Kimewari re : the manner in which the Regt. is being used, *i.e.* mere as labourers.

„ 7—Stayed at Falam. Sent movement order to Jangju to move to Haka. Called up Commandars.

Dipak, Jangju B. H. R and Awal for Conference.

April 8—Comds. Jangju and Dipak arrived and recd. Orders. All posts except B.H.R. at 28 M. S. closed.

„ 11—Jangju closed at Falam. Dipak has gone back to Nauchang. Moving forward with LAJO to-morrow. Completing all preparations.

„ 14—Klang Klang post fired at by the enemy. Amrik took out Coy. patrol and returned at 2200 hours. No trace of enemy found. No casualties to us.

„ 16—At 0830 hrs. Klang' Klang post was fired at by the enemy. He used motors to-day. Lt. Lehna Singh very bravely chased him up to Nengrang.

Enemy Strength :—70 Soldiers

13" mortar

13" mortar

5 Arm. Guns.

„ 23—Went out to raid Nengrang and Klang Klang captured 3 and killed 3 Chin's Lehna Singh's Pl. was first class—Amrit, Ram Sarup were also with me.

„ 26—1 Chin prisoner escaped from H. Kikan.

„ 28—Order received from the Div. that the Regt. has to stay Haka till fall of Imphal.

- May 10—Issued orders for raid on Kalang to all Commanders.
- „ 12—Went for rescue towards Nengrang, 28 miles of the worst. Went out at 0700 hrs. and returned 2300 hrs. Met Kimewari and received Div. orders to send Regt. main body to Ukhral.
- „ 13—Kimewari left for Muitha Haka. I am afraid I have to miss the raid. Issued orders to 3 Bn. to move to Ukhral.
- „ 21—Arrived Tamu at 0300 hours. Went and saw Maj. Faujiwara and Div. Comdr. Met Khan and stayed in his dugout.
- „ 24—Left Morehat night and arrived in Humine.
- June 4—Reached M. S. 30 and spent the night there. Met Comd. Let Div. at 1600 hrs. Role of the Div. has been changed. They are now going to participate in fight for Imphal. Div. Comd, was very courteous. He inspired confidence. He has given me a chance to select to our role in the coming operations. Of course, my choice is 'Attack Imphal'.
- „ 14—Stayed in Camp. Sent out rice collecting parties to villages.
- Lt. Masuda called in the evening. He tells me that Japanese are very near Imphal and that Palel is captured.

June 21—I told Div. Comd. either to give us a charge to fight or to revert us to our own Div. He promised to do something about it.

„ 27—Kimewari went to G. H. Q. to take orders. Men did not receive any rations. 4 Ghawallis have died of starvation. I and Ram Sarup have approached Hikari Kihan to do something about the rations. They seem NOT to take the least notice of it. I do not know what is the idea behind this deliberate starvation of my men.

July 15—Due to starvation men are dying like flies. Some committing suicide. Japanese are giving no help.

August 8—Piara's return from Yawa with Kimewari's answer. No arrangement for money or other help from him. He has suggested that our sick men at Teraun should commit suicide.

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### Exhibit 'S S'

*Extracts from the Diary of. Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan.  
(1/14 Punjab Regt.) for the year 1945.*

January 15.—Stayed in Mandalay. Maj. Dhillon arrived and rendered report re : situation at Mingyan.

February 19.—Col. Aziz has fallen ill. I have to take over No 2 Div.

„ 21.—Leaving for front to-night.  
Left for Popa at midnight. Netaji came to see me off and gave me all instructions.

- February 22—Reached KUAK PADANG at 1500 hrs. Met. Maj. Dhillon and Jagir in village Indo. They had managed to collect approx. 500 stragglers. It has been a bad show. One Bn. surrendered— Hari Ram's and others bolted. Dhillon came with me to Popa. At 0700 hrs. met Riaz and Sahgal, met Comdr. of Kanju Butai.
- „ 23—Kanju Butai has been rushed to Popa. All No 2 Regt. are going in first. Recd. Saku Butai order to push enemy across Irrawady. Went and recede defensive positions. Lectured to all officers. Called on Kanju Butai Comd. and settled up various matters. Left for Meiktela at 2300 hrs. Issued operation orders to Sahgal and Dhillon.
- „ 25—Netaji arrived early in the morning. Went and saw him at 1200 hrs. and explained Popa situation to him. He has made up his mind to go to Kuak Padang and Popa. I was dead against it as being too dangerous. 2000 hrs. Maj. Takashi brought information that the British had occupied Pyin Bin and were advancing on Taung Tha. Meiktila bridge bombed by 60/B 24's
- „ 26—At 0800 hrs. Maj Takashi reported that a Mech. Bde. of British had reached Mahlaing only 10 miles from Meiktila and that there



were no troops between there and Meiktila. We decided to make a dash for it at 0900 hrs. and reached Indo at 0045. Spent day at Indo.

March 1.—Reached Pyinmana at 0500 hrs. Met Netaji at 1100 hrs. Discussed future plan and then rushed on to Rangoon to take command of No 2 Div. No 1. Div. was reorganised and given a fighting role. Unarmed men and patients are being sent to the rear.

„ 3—Reached Rangoon at 0300 hrs. Met General Kiani and discussed various details. Decided that I should take over command of No. 2. Div. Heard about desertion of Riaz, Madan, Sarwar and Dey. A very sad affair.

„ 12—0200 hrs. reached Yenangun. Met General Yamamoto. Left Yenangun at 0900 hrs. and reached Popa at 0800 hrs.

„ 13—Talked to all officers of Div. Hq. Reorganised Div. Hq. No. 4 are out and are expected to attack Taungzin to-night. At 0200 hrs. visited Hq. No. 4. Met Maj. Jagir. S. was there. He had no information about them.

„ 14—1000 hrs. Col. Sahgal came and reported that the enemy on Pyin Bin side is on the run and that Pyin Bin has been occupied by the Japs. at 1730 hrs. Staff Officers, Maj. Marata and chief M. O. Kanletsu arrived to discuss various details. At 2300 hrs. Col. Sahgal left with two Coys. to attack Pyin Bin.

- March 15—Col. Sahgal with his force attacked the enemy in Pyin Bin on night 15/16 midnight. No enemy.
- „ 16—Khan Mohammad attacked Sadi and pt. 1186. He had fierce hand to hand fighting for 2 hrs. Inflicted at least 200 casualties to the enemy. Fighting lasted from 0300 hrs. to 0600 hrs. Men fought gloriously shouting Netaji-ke-jai. Our casualties were 1 killed and 16 wounded.
- „ 17—To-day at 1100 hrs. 1st Bn. under Lt. Mohd. Hussain was attacked by tanks. We suffered, 50 killed. To-night Khan Mohammad and Japanese again attacked Hill 1186. I with Jagir S. made an attempt to get to 4 Regt. H Q., but could not do so owing to road being under enemy fire. Capt. Sahgal returned at 0400 hrs.
- „ 18—Inspected 2 Regt. defences at Temple Hill.
- 19—Went and saw Maj. Dhillon in his H. Q. at Khabok. Met two Bn. Comdrs. Mohd. Hussain and Khan Mohd. Troops were in good spirits, especially after they had been in two attacks. Met Maj. Watanbe and discussed defence plan.
- „ 20—Received information that Khanjo are going out to attack in co-operation with Kan-

tetsu. We have to take over complete defence of Kyauk Padaung—Meiktila Rd.—K. P.—Nyaunga Rd. and Popa Hill.

No. 2/2 went out to-night.

Major Mehr Das returned from Yenangun.

March 22—Went out at 0800 hrs. and spent whole day inspecting defences of No 2. Regt. Jagir and Mehr Das went to see No. 4. Regt. at 2100 hrs.

„ 25—To-day the orders for attack on Pyin Bin by Khanjo are changed. Now Khanjo and I. N. A. main force will attack together.

„ Sent warning orders to Gurbux to prepare for it. Recce patrol went inside Meiktila and brought back information re: enemy disposition.

„ 26—Had final discussion with Comd. Khanjo and decided on the role to be played by the I. N. A. in the coming attack. Received letters from Netaji and Mahboob, warnnig me re: some undesirable officers. Recce patrols have gone out in direction of Pyin Bin.

„ 27—Issued operation orders for attack on Pyin Bin. Received. situation reports from Hussain and Gurbux. Selection of candidates for O.T.S. has started.

„ 28—Maj Mehr. Das has gone out to recce area for Div. Hq. operation orders from Nos. 2.

and 4 have been received.

March 29—Tps. are moving out. Hq. Div. going out to the area of operations. Left Popa at 2200 hrs. and went forward to see Tps. moving to their concentration areas. Halted at Legy and heard the news that Col. Sahgal, Inzuka and some other officers were ambushed. Decided to continue advance. Sahgal and other missing officers also turned up.

30—They had a most miraculous escape. We recovered our cars. I returned to Div. Hq. at 0600 hrs. Spent the day in Bivomag. Our Coy. at Kabyo has been attacked. Very extensive air activity. At 2300 hrs. left for Legy. To-night was zero day. At 2100 hrs. guns were attacked by air and 2 destroyed. We could not make any real demonstration. Captured 1 Truck 3/4 ton.

„ 31—Returned to Div. Hq. at 0600 hrs. Popa heavily bombed and m. gunned. Supplies hit Bagri with copy from Kabyu returned. Japanese were full of praise for him. Yesterday at Kabyu he saved the Japanese Coy. which was encircled. To-day I ordered him to send one Coy. to Gwedekoa. Except for aeroplanes a quiet day. At 2200 hrs. went and saw 2 Bn. on Kuakpadang Meiktila road.

April 1—Returned at 0700 hrs. Spent the day in camp. Received report from No. 4. that they

carried out the attack on Pyin Bin and surrounding Rds., but the Japanese put off their attack due to guns not turning up.

April 2—This day started with unpleasant shocks. Sig. officer No. 2 Regt. deserted. Capt. Mohd. Hussain and his Adjutant deserted from No. 4 Regt. This afternoon at about 1630 hrs. enemy shelled and m. gunned our positions at Legy. 6 wounded. Went and met Col. Sahgal at 0200 hrs. Learnt that his trusted officers were deserting Lt. Yaseen, Lt. Sadeed Lt. Gharib Singh deserted. Returned to Popa at 0500. Sent up 1 Coy. and M. M. G's. to support him.

„ 3—11.50. Col. Sahgal reported that the enemy 2 Bns. strong with 12 tanks was advancing on them. Enemy's strength increased to 50 tanks, 10 guns and 1000 men. Attacked our positions furiously throughout the day. Some enemy came in rear of us. He was attacked and thrown back. At 2200 hrs. position satisfactory. Went forward to meet Comd. Sent 1 Coy. in support. Enemy shelling positions could not meet Comd. till 0400 hrs Then he was falling back.

„ 4—He reported that most of the men, incl. Bn. Comd. Jhajeen Shah have deserted. Only approx. one Coy. is left of that Bn. Men have

taken away their arms with them. Our men fought bravely, but soon after the attack they started walking over. It appears they have had enough. Discussed details with Col. Sahgal for future course. We must push on again. Met Kuwabora and told him my point of view, re : Two Regt. withdrawal.

April 5—1. Col. Dhillon arrived.

2. Received. Kantetsu orders to re-organise and prepare for offensive role.

3. Discussed plans with Dhillon and Sahgal and allotted them respective role, i. e. No 4. to take over defences K. Padang and Popa. Asked Kuwabora to inform Kantetsu of my intentions to go out again.

„ 7—Our forward Coy. in Kyautaga area is under gun-fire. Japanese are still holding. Legyi. Br. are going rd. their flanks. Issued order to Gurbux and Sahgal re : taking over of defences.

„ 8—Kuwabora came and told me that we had to go back in the area of Magwe-Minleu-<sup>2</sup> taungdwingyl and Allenmayoo. I heard the Burmese army has revolted against the Japanese. Col. Pulsikar arrived from Prome.

„ 10—Issued orders for the move of Regts. To-day at 1400 hrs. our area of Hospital was heavily bombed, 81 killed, 30 wounded. Sick men

and other Div. auxillary unit have moved out to their new areas. Enemy gun fire is sounding very near.

April 12—Spent the day at Popa. Heaviest shelling on K. P. Nyangue rd. Enemy encircled our forward Coy. Also came astride rd. K. P. Popa. Left Popa at 0200 hrs. On the way fired at by enemy petrols. All Tpt. left on the way. Arrived next day at Ingodwaki. Loss of control on the way. 3 Bn. Still at Popa.

„ 13—0800 hrs. arrived at Indowakki. Spent the day there and left at 2100 hrs. Col. Sahgal's main force has arrived. Bagri is also through. Only Kanwal Singh Coy. is left behind and encircled by the enemy at Popa.

„ 14—At 0200 hrs. left Kyanittan and reached Eino at 0800 hrs. spent the day in Pungi Chong and left at 2200 hrs. Going is very heavy. Troops are very tired. Br. force seem to be converging from all sides—offensive toward oil field. Yenang Yaung seems to be well on the way—wonder if we will get through.

„ 18—0400 reached Magwe—Met Col. Hussain and he explained the present situation to me. Spent the day at Magwe. The situation is developing fast. Br. have occupied Taungd-

wingy. Japs. and I. N. A. counter attacking. 5 Tanks, attacked our position astride Magwe-Taungdingy Rd. They withdraw after 2 hrs. fight. Telegram received from Sahgal that he is making for Taungdwiny. Rations short. Some tps. moved across the river to Minbu. Paratroops dropped near at outpost. Man Singh moved out with his Bn. to reinforce our posts.

April 19—More tps. have arrived from Popa. A. B. and Jagir arrived. No. news of Ram Sarup. At 1500 hrs. Br. Tanks and carriers broke into our position at Magwe. No organized opposition could be put up. Magwe was occupied by them. Travelled from 1500 hours to early next morning. Crossed the river at Kanni and made west-wards with few men. Hussain, Gupta, Mehr Das, all missing. No news of Tich. at Mimbu or Man singh in his position.

„ 28—Stayed at Minde. Ram Sarup and D. C. Negi. 3/1 have gone ahead. Received. report about our men at Kama.

Recd. Maj. Gupta has arrived there.

May 1—Reached a village 5 miles north of Prome. Spent the day there. Learnt that all our parties are making for Moulmein. Jap. say Toungoo is still in their hands and that route to Thailand is still open. We are making



an effort to get out of the encirclement.

Left all sick and wounded personnel Maj. Ranganadan in Kakabusti and marched off to Prome.

May 4—Spent the day in a small hut. Rained all day. The Japanese have left us completely in the lurch. They are running themselves and are not bothering about us. To-night we made very little progress.

„ 5—0700 hrs. Reached a village 2 miles south of Okpo. The Japanese are going East from Okpo. We are going to Leptedau. They have no further use of the I. N. A. All Liaison officers, etc. were withdrawn at Prome. The discipline and morale of tps. have deteriorated, no control, officers are leaving the men.

„ 7—0800 hrs. After travelling all night reached a village 10 miles north of Taikchi. The Discipline and morale of tps. is completely gone. One soldier fired at Col. Dhillon but luckily missed. He was put away. Left the village at 2000 hrs. and reached Taikchi at midnight and found the road to Rangoon blocked.

„ 12—0700 hrs. Started and reached Wata at 1000 hrs. where we stayed for the day. Here found that Pegu was occupied by the Br. 10 days back and that Waw is under their control. Now there seems to be practically

no chance of our getting through. Sent a patrol to next village to get more information. Decided to spend the night at Wata.

May 13—Full information re : Br. forces received. Appears to me that we are completely cut off. No way to escape. At 1900 hrs. left the village and marched to a jungle where I gave full facts to the men. Majority decided to become P of W. Yet I am not prepared to surrender, and would like a little more lingering about in jungle of Burma.

„ 14—P of W. Party marched off at 1000 hrs. with Major Jagir and A. B. in charge. My party with Col. Dhillon, Major Mehr Das and 80 men stayed behind to see what the fate has in store for us, at 1600 hrs. started from a village 7 miles west of Pegu and reached village Loga approx. 16 miles west of Pegu. There are also many Japanese who are trapped in this forest. All the inhabitants are very pro-British. Our strength now is only 49.

„ 17—At about midnight 16/17 as entering the village Sitpinzeix we were heavily fired upon by men of 2/1st Punjab Regiment from a range of 15 yards. Civilian guide was killed. I lost my bag. Spent the night in jungle. 0800 hrs.

started but found all routes blocked. At 1800 hrs. captured by 2/1st and taken to Pegu Div. Hq. Corp Hq. and jail.

Exhibit 'TT'

No 245/2/2/A.

H. Qrs. Supreme Command, A.H.F.  
Burma, 9th February 1944.

All Units.

Subject.—*Special Order of the day.*

A special order of the day by Subhas Chandra Bose, Supreme Commander, Azad Hind Fauj, is forwarded herewith. All Unit Comds. will please arrange to hold a parade of tps. under their comd. and acquaint them with all available details regarding the action on the Arakan Front. The special order shall be read out to the tps. on parade and it will be translated into Hindustani and any other language that may be found necessary.

Unit Comds. will ensure that the contents of this order are made known to all those who may not be able to attend the parade.

(Sd.) P. K. SAHGAL.  
Major.

Copy:

Read. H. Qrs., S. C. for similar action as far as troops in Malaya are concerned.

Exhibit 'TT'

*Special order of the day.*

Subhas Chandra Bose, Supreme Commander, Azad Hind Fauj, Burma.

Dated 9th February 1944.

The eyes of the whole world are focussed on the Arakan Front, where events of far reaching consequences are taking place to-day. The glorious and brilliant actions of the brave units of Azad Hind Fauj working in close concert with the forces of the Imperial Nippon Army, have helped to foil all attempts by the Anglo-American forces to start counter-offensive in this sector.

I am sure that the brave deeds of our comrades on the Arakan Front will be a great inspiration to all the officers and men of the Azad Hind Fauj wherever they may be stationed at the present moment. Our long awaited march to Delhi has begun and with grim determination, we shall continue that march until the tricolour National Flag that is flying over the Arakan mountain is hoisted over the Viceregal Lodge and until we hold our victory parade at the ancient Red Fortress of Delhi.

Comrades, officers and men of the India's Army of Liberation: Let there be one solemn resolve in your hearts—'Either liberty or death.' And let there be but one slogan on your lips 'Onward to Delhi.' The road to Delhi is the road to freedom. Victory will certainly be ours.

Inqlab Zindabad : Azad Hind Zindabad.

Exhibit 'UU'

*Sadar Daftar, Ala Kaman, Azad Hind Fauj.*

(Head quarters, Supreme Command, I. N. A.)

D. O. No. 16/2/18/MS.

Burma, 16th June 1944.

Dear Colonel,

Your report, dated the 15th of May, together with your points for Netaji were received here on the 4th June. A copy of your telegram asking for lorries, horses, sugar and oil, etc, was also received on the same day.

Major N. N. Khosla together with Rear H. Qrs. had already left. I hope the M T. with the Rear H. Qrs. would be able to relieve the transport situation to some extent. We are doing our best to buy some horses, but unfortunately most of the good horses have already raised an A. T. Platoon from among the old 3rd Cavalry personnel and as soon as we have bought 20 horses, arrangements shall be made to send them on to you.

Four thousand ground sheets have already been sent with your Rear H. Qrs. No. 2, Engineer Coy., No. 2. Hospital, No. 1. M. T. Coy. and No. 1. Mortar Coy. have already left for the front. No. 1 M. T. Coy. and No. 2 Eng. Coy. shall come under Command of No. 1. Div. after they arrive in Mandalay, Although I have not been able to get the Hikari Kikan to state in absolutely concrete terms, they have given me to understand that No. 1 M. T. Coy. shall be employed to carry out tpt. duties for No. 1 Div.

We tried to get a wagon to send some soap, gur, oil and mess tins to you but unfortunately were not successful. However, a wagon has been promised us next week when No. 4. Engineer Coy. shall leave here.

At present communication between our H. Qrs. and the front line units are most inadequate. We have started

a weekly courier service between Rangoon and Mandalay and from there the H. Qrs. in Maymyo are trying to make arrangements for D. R. L. S. to the front line. I have also taken up the question of wireless communication with the Hikari Kikan. Their original objection was that our cipher was too simple, however, we produced other modified forms of our cipher which came up to their standard, but they wish to make another code based on the Nippon Army Code, for us. Even after that the question of equipment and trained personnel shall still remain and we may have to fall back on using the Nippon Signal Units to send our messages. In that case a code consisting of numerals alone may solve the script problems. I am at present trying to find some solution to this problem and if you can help me by some suggestions, I shall feel most grateful.

Every one here has been most thrilled to read about the bold action of the Unit No. 24 from 24th April to 6th May 1944. I shall feel very grateful if you will please convey my heartiest congratulations to Col. I. J. Kiani, Pritam Singh and others who took part in it.

Staff officers of the Mori Head Quarters, from time to time, inform us of the very good work being done by the units under your command and the other day we were told by a senior officer of Mori H. Qrs. who has recently returned from the front line that he had met you in the front line and that all the neighbouring units spoke very

highly of your brilliant leadership and the wonderful work being done by the units under your command. It is indeed a matter of pride for us all that the vanguard of the I. N. A. is creating traditions which the following units shall do well to follow.

Please give very best regards to Major Hassan and other officers.

With best regards.

Yours sincerely,

Jai Hind.

(Sd.) P. K. SAHGAL.

Col. M. Z. KIANI.

I. N. A.

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Exhibit 'V V'

*Sadar Daftar, Ala Kaman, A. H. F.*

*(H. Qrs. Supreme Command, I. N. A.)*

Rangoon, 20th August, 1944.

Dear Zaman,

I received your report, sent from You, on 23rd August 1944, together with a copy of Col. Shah Nawaz's report (incidentally original of that report has never been received here yesterday) and I immediately took up the reports to Netaji. Yesterday evening Netaji had a conference with Lt. Gen. Ishoda concerning the matter mentioned in your report, I was also present during the discussion. Throughout the Conference, although he promised to send telegrams here and there, it was quite apparent that either he (Gen. Ishoda) could or would do little.

Ever since, the Japanese have decided to go on the defensive, I feel a change in their attitude, which I find very difficult to explain, may be, you can explain it better than I can. Anyhow, one thing is certain that we can expect little help from Nippon authorities in Rangoon. You will have to tackle Hayachi Butai to solve most of your problems. We even offered to send a steam launch from Rangoon to relieve a Nippon steam launch in the front line which could be despatched immediately to Yirwam to evacuate the four hundred men of No. 1 Grla Regiment. But even that they did not agree to.

We have managed to collect about six lorries, which are being touched up in our workshop and as soon as they are ready, they shall be sent forward to help to solve the transport problem. Another emergency hospital' to function in Mandalay has also been organised and as soon as we can get some equipment from the Japanese, it shall be sent there.

Arrangements are also being made to buy enough cloth to give two sets of clothing to all our men coming back and a Boot shop is also being organised to make enough boots for whole of No. 1 Division. Our main difficulty is to get the materials, they are not available at any price. We, here, are trying to do our best, which is mighty little, to help the people coming back. Feeling of impotence and frustration for not being able to do anything to lessen the suffering of our comrades is terrible.



Lt. Col. Habib-ur-Rahman has gone to receive the new area where Nos. 1 and 2 Division are going to be sent, and he is expected back here any day. As soon as he returns I shall try and move up to see if I could be of any help.

Please give my best regards to Inayat, Hassan and Arshad.

Yours  
(Sd.) Prem.

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Exhibit ' WW '

*Most Secret.*

No. 104/1/52/G.

Rear H. Qrs. No. 2

Immediate

Supreme Command, A. H. F.

Burma, 21st August 1944.

Comd. No. 1. Division,

Sub.—Situation Report.

Reference your report, dated 13th August, 1944 sent from you to Rear H. Qrs. No. 1. Div., and forwarded on to the Supreme Comd. under Rear H. Qrs. No. 1. Div. No. 77/8/44, dated 15th July, and the report submitted by Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan, Comd. No. 1. Grla. Regt.

\*1. The Supreme Commander took up the matter with the Chief of the Hikari Kikan, who has promised to take the following action in the matter :—

- (a) Approach the Mori Head Quarters to allow No. 2. M. T. Coy. I. N. A. to retain their lorries until the evacuation of No. 1. Div. troops is completed.

(b) Send a telegram to make arrangements to supply rations to 150 men in Mawlik, if these men have not already been withdrawn.

(c) Send a telegram to Hayashi Butai, to try and arrange the withdrawal of 250 men from Sitlong by boats.

\*2. It is not possible to send any boats from here to Tirwan and it also appears that the Yeu river is in floods and transport up-stream is most difficult, however Chief of Hikari Kikan has promised to take up the matter with proper authorities to arrange for the evacuation of these 400 men of No. 1. Grla. Regt. in Tirawan. If it is not possible to evacuate these men at the present moment, arrangements shall be made to send ration supplies and medicines to them.

3. The Chief of Hikari Kikan pointed out that by the time reports from No. 1. Div. are received in Rangoon, it is sometimes too late to take any action, therefore, he suggested that Comd. No. 1. Div. should stay near the H. Qrs. of Hayashi Army, who may be able to help in solving our problems. The Supreme Commander has agreed to this suggestion and wishes Comd. No. 1. Div. to establish his H. Qrs. in the vicinity of the H. Qrs. of Hayashi Butai.

(Sd.) P. K. Sahgal,

Lt. Col.,

for Assistant Chief of Staff.

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\* I have just been informed that Hikari Kikan have already taken action on these points.

(Sd.) P. K. Sahgal,  
Lt. Col.

Copy to :—

H. Qrs. Supreme Command,  
Rear H. Qrs. No. 1. Division.

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Exhibit ' XX ' 

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*Most Secret.*

Immediate.

No. 103/2/11/G.,  
Rear H. Qrs., II. S. G.  
A. H. F. Burma,  
31st August, 1944.

To

H. Qrs.

Hikari Kikan, Rangoon.

Sub.—Movement of Troops.

Lt. Col. Takagi of H. Qrs. Hikari Kikan gave the following advance information to Lt. Col. P. K. Sahgal of Rear H. Qrs. No. 2. Supreme Command, A. H. F. on 30th August 1944 :—

The H. Qrs. of the Mori Army are going to issue orders to the following effect in the near future :—

The following units of the I. N. A. at present under the Command of the Hayashi Army shall revert to Command of H. Qrs., Supreme Command, A. H. F. :—

- (a) No. 1. Division less 1st Bn. of 1 Grla Regt.
- (b) No. 2. Engineering Coy.
- (c) No. 4       "       "
- (d) No. 1. M. T. Coy.
- (e) No. 11. M. T. Coy.
- (f) No. 2. Hospital.
- (g) No. 1. Medical Staging Section.

2. These units shall revert to the command of H. Qrs., Supreme Command, I. N. A., on the day of their arrival in Mandalay.

3. The future location of I. N. A. troops shall be as under :—

(a) No. 2. Div. will move to the Pakaku area.

(b) Two Regiments from No. 1. Div. will be in Myingyan area.

(c) Remainder of No. 1. Division will be in Pyinmena area.

4. Supply points for these units will be at Myingyan, Pakakku and Pyinmena.

5. The provision of medicine and building of barracks in these areas shall be the responsibility of the Nippon Garrison Commander of Mandalay.

6. No. 2. Hospital, Menywa, as soon as situation permits, will start evacuating its patients and when all the patients have been evacuated, the Hospital will leave that area and move to a place to be selected by the H. Qrs., Supreme Command, A. H. F.

7. Wherever the accommodation is not available new barracks shall be built. The H. Qrs., Mori Army, takes the responsibility of supplying the necessary materials and funds, but the construction work shall have to be carried out under the direction of the Engineers of the I. N. A.

With reference to the above information, it is requested that when the final and executive orders are issued by the Mori Army, administrative details should also be

worked out and special instructions issued on the subject at the same time.

It is considered most necessary that information on the following points should be included in the administrative instructions :—

- (i) The method of sending supplies from the Nippon supply point to I. N. A. Units.
- (ii) The amount of the material that shall be provided at each place for building of barracks.
- (iii) The amount of money that shall be placed at the disposal of I. N. A. for carrying out these construction work.
- (iv) When will the Nos. 1, 2, and 4. Eng. Coys. of the I. N. A. be available to be sent to the areas where the construction work has to be carried out.
- (v) What other facilities for this construction work may be expected from the Nippon side.
- (vi) What shall be the means of communication between H. Qrs. Supreme Command, I. N. A., and No. I and II. Divisions of the I. N. A.
- (vii) What shall be the means of communication between the troops of No. 1. Div. situated in Pyinmena area, and other troops in Myingyan area.

(Sd.) P. K. Sahgal,

Lt. Col.

Asstt. Chief of Staff.

# Exhibit ' YY '

Secret.

No. S/210/21/12  
No. 210. Unit A.H.F.  
Burma 7-2-1945.

To

202 Unit A. H. F.

Subject :—Certificate regarding state of readiness.

Ref :—Your No. 11/68/G, dated 27th January, 1945.

Certificate asked in your a/q letter is appended below :—

(i) Ready for fighting.	
(ii) 65 0. Rs. (officers deficiency will be made good Regimentally).	
(iii) As per annexure 'A' attached.	
(iv) (a) Permanently unfit.	nil
(b) Weak personnel left in lines to recover their health	147
(c) Sick in Hospital.	60
(d) On the way to Burma.	113
(e) Going on courses in No. 22 Camp and 1 Trg. Camp.	11
(f) Employed in records office Syonan	2
Total	333

(Sd.) P. K. Sahgal

Lt. Col.,

Commander No. 210 Unit,  
A. H. F.

# Exhibit 'ZZ'

UNIT NO. 422.

## Crime Report.

Charge against No. 42440 Sepoy Hari Singh.  
No. 42570 " Duli Chand.  
Place Date of offence. Offence.

Burma, 28th February 1945. (i) I. N. A. Act. Sec. 35. *Desertion.*

In that they W. O. A. S. deserted from the front line on 28th February 1945 at 2-230 hrs. until apprehended by a unit patrol sent for the purpose at 1200 hrs. on 2nd March 1945.

(ii) I. N. A. Act. Sec. 29 (c). *Directly or indirectly holding correspondence with the enemy.*

In that they W.O.A.S., attempted to communicate with the enemy on 28th February 1945 vide Exhibit (a) attached.

Service years.—4·3 months.

Date of last record entry.—Nil.

General Character.—Bad.

I. A. F. D.—901.

No. 42537 Sepoy Daryao Singh.

No. 41961 " Dharam Singh.

Name of witness Punishment By whom awarded. awarded and date.

Remanded for Div. (Sd.) P. K. Comd.'s trial. SAHGAL

(Sd.) G. S. DHILLON Lt.-Col.

Major. Offg. Comd.

Sentenced to death Unit No. 501.

under the authority Dated 6th

of Supreme Com- March 1945.

mander A. H. F.

letter, dated 21st Feb-

rury 1945, to No. 2,

Infy, Regt. and Grla.

Regt.

(Sd.) G. S. DHILLON

Major.

Commander Unit No. 420.

Signature of O. C. Burma.

Dated 6th March 1945.

Doc Identary.

Exhibit 'AAA'

*Secret*

Dated 6th April, 1945.

*Most Secret.*

No. 747 Unit. A.H. F.

No. 599 Unit A. H. F.

Dated 6th April 1945.

*Sub : Legyi Operations.*

In continuation of this office report forwarded under No. S/25/17/G, dated 2nd April, 1945, a report called for under your No. 2/XX/G. dated 6th April 1945, is forwarded herewith :—

1st April 1945 :—A Nippon Platoon stationed on hill feature 1395 astride Seiktin-Welaung road sent the following report about the enemy movements :—

- (i) At 1130 hrs. 10 enemy tanks with 50 men were seen going towards Legyi from Welaung.
- (ii) At 1530 hrs. 18 lorries, 2 tanks, 1 armoured car, 2 motor cycles and 2 guns were seen moving towards Legyi from Welaung. Out of these 11 lorries were loaded with Stores and 7 lorries carried approximately 80 men.
- (iii) At 1600 hrs. 1 tank was seen moving towards Legyi. All the tanks in the above-mentioned enemy force were medium tanks. This force was seen passing the road Nullah junction Pt. 1062 south of Seiktin map sheet 84 0/8 but no enemy was observed in the vicinity of Legyi and it was not clear whether the enemy were contemplating an attack on Legyi or whether



he intended to go through Seiktin towards Kabyu. A fighting patrol under S. O. Abdullah Khan of 546 Unit was sent to Seiktin area. This patrol contacted one small enemy fighting patrol in the vicinity of Seiktin, but no enemy formation was seen in Seiktin area. The patrol returned to the base at 0400, hrs. on 2nd April, 1945.

One Recce Patrol under S. O. Ram Dutt of 546 Unit was sent to Tada to bring back information about the enemy in that area. This patrol did not return by day-break on 2nd April, 1945.

2/Lt. Gharib Singh, Mortar Pl. Comdr. of 546 Unit deserted during the night.

There was no enemy activity during the night.

2nd April 1945 :—(i) An enemy force between 500 to 1000 strong was seen in the vicinity of the cross. 11.30 hrs. road on the 25 mile stone, Welaung-Seiktin road. There were a few lorries and a few motor cycles with this force.

(ii) Another enemy force about 1000 strong and some tanks were seen in the vicinity of the Nullah North East of the cross road at the 25 mile stone, Welaunng Seiktin road. This enemy force was seen digging in.

13. 10 hrs. 13 enemy planes heavily bombed and machine gunned Legyi for about 40 minutes. The whole of the village was set on fire and some damage was done to our positions on the left of the

road, but our casualties were only slight. As soon as the air raid was over, enemy artillery opened harassing fire on our position. This harassing fire was continued until 2105 hrs.

1600 hrs. (iii) 3 enemy tanks were seen passing Thanbin village and 3 lorries, 1 gun and 40 men were seen under the palm trees in the vicinity of Thanbin. It appeared that the enemy was carrying out a recce of that area.

1700 hrs. (iv) An enemy force in 5 lorries supported by tanks moved towards Seiktin and Legyi. In front of this force were some dismounted men who advanced forward pretending to be gathering something from the fields on either side of the road. When the enemy came within range, 1 section of machine gun opened fire. A number of the enemy were seen falling down and the remainder disappeared into the Nullah. The tanks and the lorries fled towards the cross road on the 25 milestone Welaung road. One of our machine guns was fired personally by Lt. Yasin Khan the M. G. Coy. Comdr. During the day no other enemy force approached Legyi. The enemy force that had moved towards Thanbin, also returned towards the cross road.

2200 hrs. (v) Lt. Yasin Khan Lt. Mohammad Sadiq, S. O. Abdul Hakim with some N.C.O.S. and men deserted.

2300 hrs. (vi) S. C. Ram Dutt and his men who had gone on patrol duty to Tada area, the previous

day returned and reported that there was no enemy in Tada area and that Seiktin was clear of the enemy.

- (vii) It was quite apparent that the enemy during the day, had been reconnoitring and feeling our positions and that a full scale attack was imminent the next day, therefore 1 Coy. from 548 Unit under the command of 2/Lt. Kanwal Singh was brought up and put up into position on the right flank.

3rd April 1945 :—A great deal of alarm and despondency was observed among the officers and men, owing to the desertion of Lt. Yasin Khan and his companions on the previous night. Every body appeared to feel that the enemy had full information about our dispositions and as he has such overwhelming strength, our case was hopeless. Lt. Khazin Shah was also in a very bad state of nerve. I realised that he was not fit to command the battalion any more, therefore, I sent him to keep an eye on a Coy. Comdr. whose movements were also suspicious and I personally took over the direction of the battle.

1130 hrs.—(i) An enemy force, composed as under, was seen moving towards Tasbaukkon and his forward elements had already reached Thanbin :—

Medium tanks	...	13
Light tanks	...	30
Lorries	...	60
Guns, more than	...	10
Infantry	...	1000

This report was given by a Nippon (C.P. which was in Legyi village area and it was confirmed by Comdr. C Coy. which was the left forward Coy. 546 unit. Later a part of this force was seen to be returning towards Seiktin and a large number of troops were seen debussing in the Nullah, North-East of Seiktin. A group of officers was observed carrying out reece and issuing order under a palm-grove on the right of the road, about 2 miles in front of our positions.

1200 hrs.—(iii) Enemy artillery opened harassing fire on our positions.

[1300 hrs.—(iv) An enemy force consisting as under, was seen advancing along the road towards Legyi :—

Medium tanks	...	11
Armoured cars	...	30
Lorries	...	60

This force halted about 1000 yards in front of our position and deployed.

1330 hrs.—(v) A small force of the enemy went round our night flank and attacked our 'B' Echelon. This was a complete surprize and our men were caught cooking food or carrying ammunition, rations and water. The casualties in our side were very heavy. The enemy occupied that area and was joined by some enemy tanks which moved round our left flank. No information of the action was received in the H. Qrs. until 1900 hrs.

1345 hrs. (vi)—Heavy shelling on the right flank followed by an enemy attack by approximately one

Battalion on the position occupied by one Coy. of 548 Unit. The place was gallantly defended by the coy. and the enemy was pushed back after suffering heavy casualties.

1400 hrs.—(vii) Approximately 1 platoon of the enemy opened light automatic and mortar fire in our position from the high ground astride the road in our rear. This fire was returned and the enemy was dislocated from his position.

By this time enemy artillery and mortars were shelling us from the front and our right rear and left rear.

1600 hrs.—(viii) Enemy artillery opened rapid fire on the right flank and continued the fire for approximately 10 minutes. This was followed by an attack by approx. one enemy battalion on 1 coy. of 548 unit. This coy. once again defended their position most gallantly and drove the enemy back, who after suffering heavy casualties, fled in disorder.

During the whole of this operation 2/Lt. Kanwal Singh, the Coy. Comdr. and Havl. Abdul Manan, one of the Pl. Comdrs. stood on top of 2 hills and directed the fire of their units. These two brave officers did not stir from their command posts, even when the enemy small arms fire was concentrated on them. It was due mainly to the gallant action of these 2 officers that the enemy was beaten off.

By now it was apparent that the enemy was determined to make a break through on my right flank. Therefore I decided to withdraw back into reserve C Coy. of 546 Unit which was on the left of the road. Accordingly I approached the Nippon Coy. Comdr. in that area and requested him to assume the responsibility of stopping an enemy penetration from that side and linking up with B Coy. of 546 Unit which was covering our left flank. This plan was agreed to and I ordered C Coy. Commander to withdraw his Coy. back and put one platoon astride the road south of Legyi and the remainder of the coy. to be in reserve, prepared to counter-attack in any direction where the enemy may penetrate.

1900 hrs.—(ix) Report received about the enemy attack on our B Echelon and the enemy occupation of that area. Orders issued for C Coy. to attack and drive the enemy away from that area. When these orders were issued, Lt. Khazin Shah reported to me that there was only one PL. of C Coy. available. The other two platoons under their commanders, S. S. O. Barifi Ram and Hav. Baldev Singh came running towards them and after a short conversation with the two platoon commanders, these 2 platoons and one mortar platoon went over to the enemy. This matter was reported to Lt. Khazin Shah by a Tamil soldier, who managed to get back.

Issued orders to withdraw one pl. from A Coy. and 2 sections from 2/Lt. Kanwal Singh's Coy., this together with one pl. of C. Coy. under command of Lt. Ganga Singh was to immediately attack the enemy in our B Echelon area. I ordered 2/Lt. Bhopal Singh, Regtl. Intelligence Officer to accompany Lt. Ganga Singh. Lt. Khazin Shah was in the meantime, to look after A Coy. in the absence of Lt. Ganga Singh. The attack was supported by 2/Lt. Kanwal Singh's Coy. The section of 2/Lt. Kanwal Singh's Coy. did not arrive in time but the attack was launched by two pls. at 2100 hours, and was completely successful. The enemy after suffering heavy casualties fled in disorder.

1930 hrs.—(x) Heavy artillery fire on our right flank and rear and 2/Lt. Kanwal Singh's Coy. was attacked for the third time and once again the attack was beaten off.

2100 hrs.—(xi) Enemy force about two Coys. strong accompanied by tanks moved towards the left flank of B. Coy. of 546 Unit which was covering our left flank but this force was pushed back after a short skirmish.

2130 hrs.—(xii) Report received that the enemy had been completely cleared from B Echelon area and that the attacking gp. under Lt. Ganga Singh had occupied a position on the hills astride the road south of Legyi.

(xiii) Report received that Lt. Khazin Shah with whole of his Bn. H. Q. and one pl. of A Coy. under S. O. Abdullah Khan had deserted. This matter was intimated to 531 Unit and it was requested that reinforcement should be despatched immediately. Major A.B. Singh from 531 Unit informed me that one Coy. of 548 Unit under Major B. S. Negi was moving to reinforce Legyi.

(xiv) Report received that Lt. Ganga Singh, 2/Lt. Aya Singh and 2/Lt. Narindar Singh had deserted. Ordered 2/Lt. Bhopal Singh to take command of A Coy. By now whole of the Bn. H. Q. and all the five Coy. Commanders with about 200 men including the whole of the mortar Coy. with their mortars had gone over to the enemy side. The remainder of 546 Unit could not be trusted. One Coy. of 548 Unit had fought most gallantly the whole day and by now was completely exhausted. The men had lived on biscuits and one bottle of water for 24 hours and were completely overcome by thirst and fatigue and were not in a position to stand another onslaught by the enemy.

4th April 1945—(i) 1 Co. of 548 unit with 1 Section of M. Gs. under Major B. S. Negi arrived. They had left the road well clear off Legyi and approached



our position from the east. They were heavily fired on by the enemy, but luckily suffered no casualties.

I now appreciated the situation as follows :—

- (a) Our position was completely surrounded and the enemy was overwhelmingly superior in numbers and armaments.
- (b) The morale of 546 Unit was very low and it was most likely that some of them may possibly go over to the enemy.
- (c) All the officers and men were completely exhausted and unable to face another attack by the enemy.

Therefore I sent for the Nippon Coy. Commander to consult him about our future action. He reported to me that another Bn. of his Regiment was moving up to occupy that position.

I decided to withdraw my tps. on the arrival of Nippon B. and I rang up 531 Unit to ask the Commander 531 Unit for orders, but as the Commander 531 Unit was not available I decided to act on my own initiative.

- (ii) I issued orders that on arrival of the Nippon Bn. the I. N. A. Unit in Legyi area were to fight their way eastwards. Soon after I issued these orders, I discovered that the enemy had left the road and that the road between Legyi and Popa was clear. Therefore, I altered the original orders

and issued instructions to withdraw along the road.

0430 hrs.—(iii) I received the information that the Nippon Bn. had arrived.

0500 hrs —(iv) Withdrawal was commenced and carried out without any casualties.

### **SPECIAL NOTES REGARDING DESERTIONS.**

The three most salient features re : these desertions from No. 546 units are :—

(a) All the officers who have deserted, had here to work most sincerely and considered very outstanding. Specially noteworthy among them were Lt. Khazin Shah, Lt. Yasin Khan, Lt. Ganga Singh, 2/Lt. Chain Singh 2/Lt. Balwant Singh, S. O. Barfi Ram, S. O. Abdul Hakim, and Hav. Baldev Singh. On many occasions these officers had proved their devotion to the cause, and fought bravely and I had no occasion whatsoever to doubt their loyalty.

(b) None of the officers who have gone over, ever showed cowardice, and right up to the time they went over they fought most courageously.

On the 2nd when the enemy approached our positions, Lt. Yasin Khan personally manned a M. Gun and opened fire on the

enemy and throughout the action, under heavy enemy artillery fire, he was going from post to post keeping up the morale of the men. On the night of the 29th when my party had been ambushed, 2/Lt. Balwant Singh, S. O. Barfi Ram and Hav. Baldev Singh showed complete disregard for their personal safety and fought most bravely.

S. O. Abdullah Khan had already distinguished himself for which he had been recommended for the award of Veer-e-Hind and he and S. O. Abdul Hakim were always singled out for the most difficult patrols.

On the night of 3rd Lt. Ganga Singh with about 45 men attacked and drove away a much superior force of the enemy.

- (c) Not a single person ever showed cowardice in the face of the enemy. Our positions were attacked by very superior numbers, but not a single person ever left his post. We, with small Units, attacked the enemy much superior in numbers and in armaments, but not a single soldier ever wavered. There were no desertions from a Unit as long as the Unit was in contact with the enemy, on the contrary, the Units fought with unrivalled determina-

tion and utmost bravery. Lt. Inuzuka, the Hikari Kikan Liaison Officer, was so impressed by the brave fight put up by these officers and men that he told me that that was the biggest battle ever fought by the I.N.A. against such overwhelming numbers of the enemy. He felt that the manner in which the unit had fought surpassed even the Nippon tps. He conveyed these expressions to H. Q. 531 Unit with a request to pass them on to H. E. Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, the Supreme Commander, Azad Hind Fauj.

After a very careful study of these points and the circumstances under which the unit fought, I am of the opinion that these desertion were mainly due to the following causes :

- (i) Turkey's alignment alongside the anti-axis powers has had a very adverse effect on certain Muslim Officers. In spite of our efforts to explain to them the circumstances under which Turkey has been forced to join the War, the officers feel that by fighting against powers that are allied with the Turks, they are being disloyal to Islam.
- (ii) In the minds of a number of officers and men there is a lack of faith in our final victory. They are in their own minds convinced that the Anglo-Americans are going to win the war and it is futile to carry on the struggle.

(iii) In this particular operation, after the desertion of Lt. Yasin Khan and his companions, there was a general feeling among the officers and men of the Unit that it was useless to continue fighting against the enemy, so superior in numbers and armaments and helped by the traitors, who had gone over to his side. Majority of these officers, under normal circumstances, would never have done anything treacherous, but finding themselves so overwhelmed, they did not have the moral strength to continue the struggle and decided to save themselves by going over to the enemy.

Before I conclude this report, I, feel it my duty to pay a tribute to the steadfastness, devotion to duty and bravery of those of the officers and men (although some of them turned traitors afterwards), who fought most courageously and desperately against heavy odds and checked the enemy from penetrating our positions. Thinned in numbers, exhausted by hunger and thirst, weary both in mind and body, these brave soldiers of the A. H. F. tenaciously hung on to their posts until the arrival of the Nippon force.

There were many cases of individuals whose actions deserve merit, these are being investi-

gated and a fuller report will be submitted about them when these investigations have been completed.

Sd/-P. K. Sahgal

Lt. Col.,

Commander No. 747 Unit A. H. F.

After writing this report, another important fact has come to light. In majority of the cases, when officers were going over to the enemy, they ordered the N. C. Os. and men under their commands to move with them under the pretext of either changing their dispositions or of attacking the enemy. Enquiries are being made into such cases and attempts are being made to separate the names of those persons who have gone to the enemy of their own accord and those who have been taken away under false pretences.

Sd/- P. K. Sahgal,

Lt. Col.

# Exhibit 'BBB'

A. H. F.	Dakhil	PAIGAM KA FORM	Muhr.
Pukar aur Hidayaten.	kharij.	6 Majmua Alfaz M. A.	Thrikh Daftar.

(Is Lakir se upar sirf signals istimal karenge).

To H. Qrs. Supreme Command, Rear H. Qrs. No. 2 Div.  
Batarf. 6

As Tarf.	Likhari ka Number,	TARIKH.	Number ka Jawab.
From	Adv. H. Qrs. No. 2 Div.	No: PSI Date 16	

Enemy Penetration Reported in the front of No. 4 Grla. Regt. (.) At present no communication with No. 4 Grla. Regt. (.) 200 fighting soldiers are at present available in Popa. With these soldiers I will occupy strong points in POYOYWA Hill and PAGAN—KYAUK PADANG Road. Hospital is being established at Gwegyo.

Yth paigam jaise likha gaya Har Tariqe To be sent in cipher Likhari ki Hidayaten Paigam Lakhne  
se bheja ja sakta hai. (Sd.) P. K. SAHGAL Haruf Indaraja. ka Waqt.  
Signed. Lt.-Col. Immediate. (P. L. W.)  
Signed. 13.15 hrs.  
(is Lakir se neche sirf signals istimal karenge.) (P. D. W.) Paigam Dene kawaqt.

Tariqa Waqt Parhne- Bhejne- Tariqa Parhne- Bhejne- Paigam  
Dakhil wala. kharij. wala. kharaj. kharij wala Wasuli ka  
waqt (P. W. W.)

Exhibit 'CCC'

*Secret*

*Special order of the day*

By

*Lieut. Colonel P. K. Sahgal Offg. Comd. No. 2 Div.*

*A. H. F.*

21. In a special message addressed to the Commander of No. 2 Div. A. H. F. His Excellency Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, the Supreme Commander of the A. H. F. has called upon all Officers and men of No. 2 Div. to make every sacrifice and to exert all their efforts to defeat the enemies of India.

*Sathio*, we have the privilege of fighting in the foremost ranks of A. H. F. so it behoves every one of us to be prepared to make the supreme sacrifice to uphold the honour and glory of Free India.

Enemies of India have managed to cross over to the left bank of the Irrawadi and our valiant allies, the Nipponese, are fighting grimly to defeat and annihilate this enemy.

Owing to the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, their morale has gone very low. They are entirely depending upon their air support to carry on fighting, but whenever they have been attacked by our forces, they have always fled from the battlefield.

In the name of thousands of martyrs who have patiently suffered for the cause of Free India and in the name of the heroes of the A. H. F. who have sacrificed



their lives at the altar of India's Independence, I call upon all the officers and men of No. 2 Div Azad Hind Fauj, to hunt for the enemies of India and destroy them wherever they may be found.

JAI HIND

Sd/- P. K. Sahgal,  
Lt. Col.

Offg. Comd. No. 2 Div. A. H. F.

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Exhibit 'DDD'

Extract from the Diary of Capt. P. K. Sahgal (2/10 Baluch Regt.) for the year 1945.

- Jan. 24. Went to the range in the morning and fired the new Mortar, it is a very accurate weapon, but the ammunition situation is not very satisfactory. Very busy carrying out the re-organisation of the Regt. In the evening received orders that 29th has been finally fixed as the date for my move.
- Jan. 27. The whole day very busy getting my first Bn. ready to move.
- Jan. 31. Issued orders and instructions regarding the move of the Div. from Prome to Kyauk Padaung.
- Fe. 4. New Promotions have been published and there was a ceremony at Netaji's banglow when Zaman was presented with Major General badges rank. Saw Netaji for short time about the move of my Regt.
- Feb. 8. Got the news that my Role is going to be defence of Popa Hill.

- Feb. 13. Left Rangoon at 0700 hrs. by car—spent the day at Sako Butay H. Q. Rest house. Had a long discussion with Major General Iwakuro about the employment of No. 2 Div.
- Feb. 17. Arrived at Yenang Yaung early in the morning. Recd. reports that enemy had already crossed the Irrawaddy river most serious. Met Maj. Gen. Yamanoto and discussed the situation with his Staff Officers.
- Feb. 18. Arrived at Popa early in the morning and met Dhillon who had arrived the previous day. Dhillon told me that the crossing took place on his right flank where Japanese troops were guarding the crossing. He also told me that Capt. Hari Ram with a number of officers and men had gone over. One of his Coys. and one Pl. refused to go over to the enemy. Capt. Chander Bhan's Bn. fought most gallantly and at the end managed to extricate themselves. He expected within the next 2/3 days, he will be able to gather nearly 500 men. This is good news.
- Feb. 19. Dhillon is very despondent about the condition of the Regt. There is no discipline left and the morale is gone. They are a source of nuisance to me also because they wander about and give away my positions also.
- Feb. 22. Col. Shah Nawaz and Boobi arrived early this morning. Col. S. N. is taking over the Tempy.

Command of the Div. until Col. Aziz gets well. Spent the day explaining the current situation to Col. S. N. Comd. in preparing the defences of Popoa. Came to call on Col. S. N. He seems to be a decent sort.

Feb. 23. Climbed up Pt. 1640 with Col. S. N. to explain to him the defences of Popoa. An order from Saku Army was received to the effect that the I. N. A. units should carry out Guerrilla activities to help the Nippon units attacking the enemy. S. N. decided to form 4 Coys. out of No. 4 Guerrilla Regt. for this job. Went with S. N. to see Dhillon, who agreed to S. N's plan. S. N. left to report the situation to Netaji.

Feb. 24. Early morning received information that enemy tanks have broken through a Seiktin. One Bn. of Kanju Unit has taken up a defensive position at Kyauk Padaung Myingyian road. My Regt. takes over the responsibility for Popoa Pyinbin road. Sending out a recon patrol to find out the situation on this road. I may have to employ one of Dhillon's Coys. to carry out Guerrilla warfare in Pyinbin area.

Feb. 27. Late last night report came thro' that some enemy had gone to Pozu near Kyauk Padaung and it was confirmed that it was only a fighting patrol supported by tanks and carriers. I am convinced that we must attack Meyne immediately

but I have no force available for the task. I requested the Kanjo unit to either take up a defensive position in my area for a day and relieve my forces for an offensive or to lend me a couple of Coys. to co-operate with my attacking units. I hope the Comd. will agree with either of the two suggestions.

Feb. 28. Information from Nippon source that some enemy lorries have been seen going towards Kyauk Padaung from Pyinbin. I do not consider the Inf. trustworthy. Kanju Butai is going to attack the enemy tonight. I've promised to block the road behind the enemy to cut off his retreat.

March 1. I had to sentence an officer to death this morning for refusing to go to the front. What a pity! it is such a waste of human life. Information received that Majors Riaz, Madan, Sarwar, Dey and Lt. Mohammad Bux who went on an exercise last night have not so far returned. I am terribly worried about them. I do hope that they have not gone over to the enemy.

March 2. Those officers have not returned so far. I am certain they have gone over to the enemy—the treacherous swines. From now on I am going to be absolutely ruthless. I have already replaced one Bn. Comd. I have issued orders that any one making a suspicious movement is to be shot immediately. I wish Shah Nawaz would come

back soon and take charge of his Division, then I can devote more attention to my own Regt.

March 3. News from Khanjo Butai that they are going to start an offensive w. e. f. tonight. I have promised to protect their left flank during the attack, but I am very keen that at least some of our own forces should participate in the offensive. I hope the Nippon side will agree to my suggestion.

March 4. Comd. of Kanjo Butai came to have dinner with me while we were having dinner, news came that my patrol had captured 3 cars and put to flight an American patrol who left 3 dead bodies behind

March 5. Managed to bring back 2 of the Jeep cars and the captured arms and ammunition and one wireless set. About 1200 hrs got the report that an enemy force about 500 strong with tanks and guns were advancing towards No. 1 Bn.s position. I rushed to Bn. area where I got the news that the enemy had burned Daungle and was around there. I had 2 platoons out, one of which kept on harassing the enemy who moved off towards my right flank. Got the news that the Japanese Bn. on my right had moved forward and that my right flank was in the air. Rushed up one Coy. to 4 Guerrilla and 2 platoons of No. Inf. to fill up the gap. No attack by the enemy.

March 6. A quiet today. The enemy force that came yesterday did not stay to fight. Enemy threat on

the Kyauk Padaung Meiktilla road getting to be dangerous. Ordered No. 4 Guerrilla Regt. to take up a defensive position around Kyauk Padaung to meet any enemy advance from Meiktilla or Pagan side. Kawabara told me that it was most likely that my Regt. would carry out an offensive along the Kyauk Padaung Pagan Road. I hope it will be so, because I am confident my Regt. would give a very good account of themselves in such an action.

March 7. Bulk of my Regt. has not so far arrived and as we have to get a Regt. ready to undertake the attack by the 10th. Much against my will, I had to detail No. 4 Guerrilla Regt. for the attack. In the afternoon received a message that an enemy patrol is in village 3 miles from Daungle. I have told Khazin Shah to carry out a raid. I hope it will be successful. Went to look for 2nd Division parties, found one on the way. Discovered that they had been delayed owing to a heavy air raid.

March 8. One party of the 2nd Division arrived to-day. One S.O. and Sep. had been killed owing to enemy air raid and two persons had been wounded. In spite of every thing, the moral and spirit of the men is very high. Enemy aeroplanes dropped pamphlets specially addressed to the officers and men of my Regt. These pamphlets were signed by Maj. Mohammad Sarwar, the dirty swine.

March 11. Lt. Ali Hussain with one S. O. and two other men went over to the enemy to-day. They tried to take one of my Sèpoys with them, but he escaped from them and came back. I have taken into custody all the officers and men whose movements are suspicious.

Dhillon has gone into attack to-day. I hope he will do something really good. We need, too, to wash off the disgrace that has been caused by these traitors.

March 13. Dhillon must have gone into attack last night, but no news of the result as yet.

March 14. News that PYNBIN has been re-occupied by the Japanese and other are only about 500 enemy in Taungoon.

I must attack them immediately. The enemy, I believe, is on the retreat. Dhillon attacked Taungoon last night, but there was no enemy. I have made up my mind to move out to-night with two companies of Banta Singh's Bn. and attack the enemy.

March 15. Marched off from Popaywa last night at 2330 hrs. and arrived in Setstyo at 0600 hrs. to-day. Marching thro' the sand very hard indeed, Bullock carts carrying water could not reach us, nor could my car and the motor cycle. Had to buy water locally. Laid with the Nippon Coy. Comd. who said that he knew everything about the enemy.

dispositions. Decided to attack to-night with one platoon of the Japanese co-operating, I had a severe attack of Diaphorrea—feeling very weak.

March. 16. Left Setstyo at 2130 hrs. on the 15th. Arrived Myene at 2330 hrs. Met no enemy on the way. Took up a position at Myene with 2 pls. Attacked from the left flank with one coy. under 2/Lt Jogindar Singh and made a faint from the right flank with one Platoon under Amar Chand. Two sections of the Japanese accompanied J. S. and one S. C. A. C. J. S. attacked 4 lines of the enemy trenches, but met no enemy.

March 17. The Japanese were reluctant to go forward after the first line, but J. S. had to beat them to take forward. A. C. met a small patrol of the enemy who opened fire on him. A. C. replied by throwing grenades. Casualties enemy about 8 to 10 killed. Our side one killed and one missing. Returned to Setstyo in the morning and spent the day there. Left Setstyo at night and marched back and arrived Popaywa in the morning of the 17th.

March. 19. News from Dhillon. His fellows are putting up a brave show; they attack a hill 3 times and eventually captured it and killed about 300 enemy; his casualties have been pretty heavy too.

March 20. Khango unit has been ordered to prepare themselves to go into attack. I have to take over the



defence of the whole of Popoa and Kyauk Padaung area. Moved Banta Singh's Bn. to cover Kyauk Padaung-Meiktilla road. No definite information about the enemy in Meiktilla area. I have ordered B. S. to send a patrol in that area to find out. Shah Nawaz has told the Japanese that we must be given a share in the offensive. I quite agree with him, but do not think will get a chance too.

March 23. Last night went to Kyauk Padaung and in the morning went round Banta Singh's position—a hot and tiring business. Japanese patrol returned from Meiktilla area. After receipt of the information I am convinced that we should attack Meiktilla from our side. Of course, we must have more detailed information about the general situation before we can undertake such an attack and must coordinate it with the Japanese attacks.

March 26. Our milk goat died in the morning. So from now on we shall be in milk-less coffee. Conference with the Khanji Comd. about the coming operations and sent out patrols to recon the area in which I shall be operating. I do not like the task that has been allotted to Dhillon. Both our resource in tpt. we shall never be able to keep him supplied with water. I suggested to Shah Nawaz that he should be withdrawn from that area.

March 27. I have been reading Stonewall Jackson, there is little doubt that he was a great General. Still

he is so little heard of. I put up my plan to Shah Nawaz and he has approved of it. It is a simple one. I am going to put a Bn. astride and in the high ground in the right of Sektien-Welong Road and basing one Bn. N. W. of Perktien. Carry out harassing attacks against enemy in Pyinbin from Tada area.

March 28. The Nippon Haidan which was expected to be in Sektien area has not arrived so far. So my plan of action is, I think, a very sound one. Elaborated it and issued orders. One to be due to move to-night. Shah Nawaz sent for me at about 19-30 hrs., he is very worried, because he has no reserve at hand in case the enemy counter-attacks along Pynbin-Ovin Road, I do not think it is likely. I consider an enemy counter stroke from Welong side more likely, still S. N., persisted so I had to alter my plans. I will put only one Coy. to defend Welong-Sektien Road and leave the remainder of the Bn. Popaya area until the arrival of Dhillon's Comd. when I may expect them to join me.

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Exhibit 'EEE'

No. 7/2/1/Ms.

Security.

H. Qrs. Supreme Command, A. H. F.

Burma, 26th March, 1944.

All Formations and Units.

Subject.—*Personal numbers-officers.*

Personal numbers to officers have been allotted according to the attached list.

These numbers have been allotted alphabetically in each rank and not according to seniority.

In future whenever an individual is appointed a S. O. or a 2/Lieut, he shall be allotted a number by the Military Secretary.

These numbers shall invariably be quoted in all correspondence.

If any officer of the A. H. F. has not been allotted a number in this list the matter shall immediately be brought to the notice of the Military Secretary.

Comdrs. of units and formations, etc., and officers-in-charge records are responsible to ensure that these numbers are entered in the records of individual officers.

(Sd.) P. K. Sahgal, Major,  
Military Secretary.

#### Allotment of personal numbers officers.

Personal No.	Rank.	Name	I. N. A. Unit	I. A. Unit.
				allotted.
A. H. F. 22	Lt.-Col.	Shah Nawaz Khan,	H. Q. I. Grla. Regiment	1/14 Pb. Regt.
"	38 Major	Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillon	H. Q. S. Grla. Regiment.	"
"	84 "	P. K. Sabgal	H. Q. S. C.	2/10 Balauch Regiment.

Exhibit 'FFF'

No. A/19/18.

No. 125 Unit A. H. F.

To  
Liaison Officer, Burma, 22nd December 1944.

Hikari Kikan Myingyan.

Subject.—*War Prisoners—Possessions of.*

Reference. Two British officers who were taken prisoners by A. H. F.

Along with the two Ps. O. W. one revolver with its case was also taken from my N. C. Os. by the Japanese soldiers. As the British officers were made prisoners by the A. H. F., please arrange to collect the revolver and return to these Head-Quarters. Maps and other articles may be kept by the Japanese as they may need it for examination.

With thanks.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon Major,  
Commander No. 125 Unit.

22-12-44.

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Exhibit 'GGG'

No. 6/5/G.

No. 501 Unit A. H. F.

Security.

Burma, dated 2nd March, 1945.

Immediate.

*All Units and Formations.*

Subject.—*Secrecy and Security.*

The code numbers allotted to units have been changed to read as under and will be taken into use forthwith :—

	No. 2	Division	
Adv. Div. H. Qrs.	501	Main Div. H. Qrs.	502
H. Q. No. 1 Inf. Regt.	510	1/1 Inf. Regt.	511
2/1 Inf. Regt.	512	3/1 „ „	513
H. Qrs. No. 2 Inf. Regt.	515	1/2 „ „	516
2/2 Inf. Regt.	517	3/2 „ „	518
H. Qrs. No. 4 Grla. Regt.	420	1/4 Grla. „	421
2/4 Grla. Regt.	422	3/4 „ „	423
No. 1 Anti-Tank Coy.	527	No. 2 Div. Signals	529
No. 2 A. B. O. D.	530	No. 2 F. P. S. C.	531
No. 2 M. E. S.	532	Pt. Amn. Dump.	533
No. 2 Workshop	534	No. 2 S. I. S.	535
P. O. L. Section	536	Medical Aid Party	338
No. 4 Engineer Coy.	352	Dett. M. P.	325

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,  
Major 'G'.

Copy to No. 60 Unit, A.H.F., for information.

**Exhibit 'HHH'**

Secret.

No. 6/6/G.

Immediate.

No. 251 Unit A. H. F.

Burma, dated 2nd March, 1945.

To

All Formation Units.

**Subject.—Pass Word.**

Commencing from to-day all formations and units in POPA Hill area will use the following Pass Word for the purpose security.

'Rangoon Mandalay'

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,  
Major 'C'.

### Exhibit 'III'

Most Secret.

#### Intelligence Summary No. 3.

501 Unit, dated 3rd March, 1945.

*Reference.* Map Sheet No. 840, 84k. and 84 P. scale 1" to 4 miles or 1"250000.

28th February 1945 : Enemy was reported to be advancing towards Kyauk, Padaung by Pyinbin, Letpyinbin road. An attack was put up by certain Japanese units but it was found out afterwards that there was no enemy.'

Undermentioned officers with their batmen went on exercise with all Div Axcillary Units. Units came back safely with the officers and their batmen did not. It appears that either they have been captured or have gone over to the enemy side :—

Major Mohammad Riaz Khan, Major P. J. Madan, Major S. N. Dey, Major Mohammad Sarwar and Lt. Mohammad Bakhsh.

1st March 1945 : Nothing much happened during these days. Patrol activity from our side continued. Enemy tried to encircle the Guerrilla party in the vicinity of Tibu, but failed. Our Patrols went up to Seiktien and Welaung and got information that enemy has gone towards Taungtha. The enemy strength was 12 tanks, and 500 lorries. No enemy could be seen on the roads between Taungtha, Welaung and Seiktien. Neither a Telephone line. Most of the civilians are pro-Americans as they are given rice, milk, cigarettes. P. T. shoes and

clothes by the enemy. OYE parties had to pretend that they were on the American's side in order to get information from the civilians. It was also found out that the enemy is strong in medium and light tanks as well as carriers.

Following forms the enemy :—

Americans—Not much.

Indians, Gurkhas, Negroes, Chinese and Kochins.

One of our parties was very heavily bombed at a place about six miles from Popoa in the Northernly direction. Our losses were the following :—

Rifles 6	... Equipment 8
Bayonets 6	... Rounds 303" ball 500
Grenades 2	... Blankets 9
Ration Tins 11	... Pay books 8
Ground sheets 11	...

Only one man was slightly wounded.

3rd March 1945 : Reference.—Intelligence Summary No. 1 of 25th February 1945.

The enemy which had gone from Pyinbin towards East and Taungtha has now been reported to have gone partly to putting up an offensive from Myingyan towards south from Meiktila towards Taungtha from Popa towards Pyinbin, while A. H. F. Troops are going to attack from Kyauk parading towards Nyaungu.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,

Dated 3rd March, 1945.

Major 'C'.

Distribution. No. 60 unit No. 502 unit No. 510 unit.  
No. 515 unit No. 420 unit (2 copies 1 for  
each base).

- Hikari Kikan.
- War Diary (2 copies).
- File (2 copies).

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Exhibit 'JJJ'

Most Secret.

Intelligence Summary No. 4.

No. 501 Unit A. H. F., dated 4th March, 1945.

Reference. Map Sheet No. 84 0,84k and 84 P Scale 1"  
4 miles or 1" 250000.

3rd March 1945: Enemy about 300 strong, Nationality Indian, was located digging near Kaungnyo. On Kyaune Padaung-Nyaung Road, four carriers were seen 13 miles from Eyauk Padaung. Later on, towards the evening at about 2000 hrs. some enemy estimated about 500 was also found about eight miles from Kyaunk Padaung on the same road.

A recce patrol of the enemy came about two miles from Pozu at 1800 hrs. They were fired at by a Japanese post thus making them run away.

It has been found that the villagers round about Taung Lin area, given information to both sides. They have told the enemy that Azad Hind Fauj is located in most of those villages. The result is that the enemy is very cautious. The enemy tactics are very much dependent on



tanks, armoured cars and carriers. Usually they do not send out a party less than about a hundred. The vehicles carrying these parties are escorted in front and in the rear by A. F. Vs. on reaching a place where they need stopping, they fix their M. Gs. and Mortars before debussing the troops.

Dated 4th March, 1945.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,

Distribution :

Major 'C'.

No. 60 Unit, A. H. F.

No. 510 „ „

No. 420 „ „ (2 copies one for each base).

No. 502 „ „

No. 515 „ „

Hikari Kikan.

War Diary (2 copies).

File (2 copies).

### Exhibit 'KKK'

No. 6/8/G.

Security.

No. 50 Unit., A. H. F.

Burma, dated 6th March, 1945.

All Units and Formations.

**Subject—*Safety and Security.***

It has been noticed that many new foot paths have been made in the camps. As the enemy is superior in air, these paths give out exact positions of our location. Unit commanders and officers must always keep their men warned against this danger.

Still, sentries are found at night challenging very loudly or making enquiries from approachers in a very loud tone. An enemy spy near about can get much information which may cause us many lives and apart from that give enemy a tactical advantage. May unit commanders please take steps to check and rectify this common mistake.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,  
Major 'C'.

Copy to Hikari Kikan.

Exhibit 'LLL'

*Most Secret.*  
Copy No 3.

No. 501—Unit A. H. F.

Operation Order No. 2.

Ref.—Map sheets K. P. C. L. 1"—4 Miles, 1=250,000

1. *Information.*—Enemy. On 5th, the enemy patrol composed of 4 tanks and about 500 infantry were seen operating in the area Daungle on Popaywa-Pyinbin road and, after making contact with patrol of 515 unit the enemy is reported to have withdrawn back from that area. No enemy reported on Popaywa-Taungtha road. On Eyaunk Fadaung Taungozin road at a distance of 9 miles from Kyauk Padaung, 200 enemy infantry with 7 lorries and 3 carriers are reported to be digging in. This enemy mainly consisted of Americans and Indians.

On Kyauk Padaung Meiktila road, small forces of enemy supported by tanks, have been reported near Taungywa.

*Own troops.*—Kaungjo Unit of Nippon Army is attacking the enemy along on Popaywa-Taungtha Road and Popaywa-Pyinbin Road.

One Company of Japanese Engineers in the area Nyaun Gan on Kyauk Padaung Meiktila Road. Dispositions of 515 and 420 Units is as before.

2. *Intention.*—Units under command of 501 unit will :

1. Occupy defensive positions round Popa Hill Kyauk Padaung and Nyaunggan area and stop and annihilate any enemy approaching these defences.

2. Keep Popaywa Yenangaung Road clear.

3. Co-operate with the attacking Nippon units to annihilate the enemy which has crossed over the East of Irrawaddy.

3. *Method.*—No 420 unit will undertake the defence of Kyauk Padaung and Nyaunggan areas. Commander 420 unit will liaise with Commander Nippon Engineering unit in Nyaunggan area to get detailed information about the defensive positions in that area. Commander 420 unit will occupy these positions in sufficient strength to check any enemy advance in that direction, and with the remainder of his forces he will undertake active Guerrilla operations on Kyauk Padaung. Meiktila and Kyauk Padaung Taungsein Road. All units of 420 unit in Popa area will move to their new positions on the night of 6th/7th March 1945.

No. 515 unit with two platoons of 510 unit under command, will undertake the defence of Popa. He will

also carry out active patrolling in front of his defensive positions.

*Anti-Tank defence.*—Commanders 420 and 515 units will arrange to erect anti-tank obstacles and lay anti-tank mines at suitable points. No. 352 unit, under directions of D. A. G. 501. unit, will under-take all duties in the camp area and will form a general reserve in the hand of Commander 501 unit.

4. *Administration.*—‘Q’ 501 unit will arrange to provide transport for the move of 420 unit so that the move will be completed on the night of 6th/7th March 1945. He will also make arrangements to issue extra rations to make up the scale of Dhall 100 grammes and oil 20 grammes per day.

5. *Communication.*—Commander 529 unit will arrange to send a D/R to 420 unit every night starting Popaya at 2100 hrs. with effect from 7th March 1945. He will also arrange to get a Motor Cycle, put it into working order and attach with 420 unit for duty.

6. *Acknowledge.*

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,  
Major ‘G’.

Dated 6th March, 1945.  
Time 1500 hrs.

---

*Distribution :*

Copy No. 1	No. 510 Unit.
„ „ 2	No. 515 „
„ „ 3	No. 420 „
„ „ 4	Hikari Kikan.
„ „ 5	D. A. G.
„ „ 6	D. Q. M. C.
„ „ 7 and 8	War Diary.
„ „ 9 and 10	Office copy.

Dear Jagir,

Jai Hind. I hope most of your queries have been answered in this order, other I will answer when I come to-morrow. I ought to have come to-day, but last night I went to check certain defences and on my arrival back I felt very weak, so weak as I have never felt before throughout my life. Major Shanker gave me an injection today, though to complete the course I must get 12 yet, there are no more available except a few. I will get one to-morrow. I have also to hand over this 'G' work.

I am sending Mohindar Singh to you to make necessary arrangements for the reception of and dispositions of 421 and 423 units. Ala liaison with Maj. Wats Nathe at Nyaunggan, and see that units are such placed as to deal with the enemy effectively.

I will come to-morrow without fail.

Yours

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon.

# Exhibit 'MMM'

UNIT NO. 422.

## Crime Report.

Charge against No. 42570 Sepoy Duli Chand, No. 42400 Sepoy Hari Singh,  
No. 42537 Sepoy Daryao Singh, No. 41961 Dharam Singh.

I. A. F. D 901.

Place.	Date of offence.	Offence.	Name of witness.	Punishment awarded.	By whom awarded and date.
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Burma.	28th February 1945.	(i) I. N. A. Act. Sec. 35. <i>Desertion.</i>	Recommended for Divisional Comd's trial,		
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In that they W.O.A S. deserted from the front line on 28th February 1945 at 2230 hrs. until apprehended by a unit patrol sent for the purpose at 1200 hrs. on 2nd March 1945.

(ii) I. N. A. Act Sec. 29 (c). *Directly or Indirectly Holding correspondence with the enemy.*

In that they W.O.A.S., attempted to communicate with the enemy on 28th February 1945. *vide* Exhibit (a) attached.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon.  
Sentenced to death.  
Under the authority of Supreme Comdr.  
A. H. F. letter, dated 21st February 1945, to No. 2 Inf. Regt. and No. 4, Grla. Regt.

P K. Sahgal, Lt.-Col. Offg. Comdr. Unit No. 501. Dated 6th March 1945.

Documentary.

Service—years 3.  
Date of last record entry—Nil.

General Character—Bad.

One copy forwarded to No. 501 unit on 8th March 1945.  
Adjt.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon, Major.  
Comdr. Unit No. 420.  
Signature of O. C. Burma, dated 6th March 1945.

# Exhibit 'NNN'

*Most Secret.*

## Intelligence Summary No. 5.

No. 501—Unit A. H. F. Dated 7th—March, 1945.

Ref. Map sheet No. 840 84 K, and 84 P Scale 1"=4 miles or 1"=250,000. 4th March, 1945—A fighting patrol of about 20 men, under command of S. Abdullah Khan No. 516: unit A. H. F., was reconnoitring the area of Daungle village on 4th March 1945, at 1700 hrs., when the patrol was informed about the arrival of an enemy patrol in the area O 14558 Map Sheet No. 84/P1. by a Burmese. The enemy patrol consisted of 15 British soldiers carried in three Jeep cars behind. It was confirmed from the Burmese that all the other numbers of the enemy patrol had also been wounded before they fled.

Following arms, ammunitions, equipment and vehicles were captured from the enemy :—

Cars (jeep)	3	Gas checks	3
Bren Gun	1	Binoculars	2
Sten Gun	1	Compasses	1
Rifles	2	Shorts	2
Discharges cup	1	Blankets	8
Grenades	8	web Equipment sets	6
Ammunition Rounds	400	Map Sheet 84/1/13	1
Wireless sets	1	Bren Gun Magazines	6
Sten gun Magazine	8	Tools for 3 cars	3
		Some quantity of Toilet material.	

On examination it was ascertained that the enemy dead were British and from the documents captured, it was confirmed that they belonged to 2nd Lancaster Regiment.

The documents which were captured from the enemy will be sent in due course. The Map sheet which was captured from the enemy is sent to you.

Our losses were one slightly wounded.

From the documents found in the cars it appears that upto the end of Nov. 44, 2nd. Bn. S. Lancer were in Kohima in Dec. They moved to Palel and the Bn. has now arrived in this sector from Palel.

On the same date enemy with 7 lorries 3 carriers strength about 200 mostly Indians and few Americans were seen 9 miles from Kyauk Padaung on Kyauk Padaung Taungfin road. When they saw our patrol, they showed a white flag but when our patrol called them, they tried to open fire. Patrol being weak in numbers came back.

5th March 1945.—Out posts and forward patrols of No 515 unit saw an enemy composed of 4 tanks and about 500 infantry operating in Daungle area. As a result of some fire from both sides the enemy withdrew.

Patrols of 420 units found some enemy about 9 miles from Kyauk Padaung on Kyauk Padaung Taungzin road near a village Dhatsi. They were digging. This appears to be a permanent position.

On Kyauk Padaung Meiktilla road, small forces of enemy supported by tanks have also been reported by 420 units.



6th March 1945,—Nothing unusual.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon

Major G 8.

Dated 7th March, 1945.

Time 1245 hrs.

*Distribution:*

No. 50 Unit            A. H. F.

No. 510    „            „

No. 420    „            „ (two copies one for each base)

No. 502    „            „

No. 515    „            „

Hikari Kikan

War diary (2 copies)

File        (2 copies).

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Exhibit '000'

*Sadar Daftar Ala Kaman, Azad Hind Fauj,*

Rangoon

12th. March, 1945

Major G. S. Dhillon,

Jai Hind,

I have been following the work of your Regiment and of yourself with the closest interest and I want to congratulate you on the manner in which you have stood up to face bravely the situation that is difficult. I want to express my complete confidence in you and in all those who are standing by you in the present crisis.

Whatever happens to us individually in the course of this historic struggle, there is no power on earth that

can keep India enslaved any longer. Whether we live and work, or whether we die fighting, we must, under all circumstances, have complete confidence that the cause for which we are striving, is bound to triumph. It is the finger of God that is pointing the way towards India's freedom. We have only to do our duty and to pay the price of India's liberty. Our hearts are with you and with all who are with you in the present struggle which is having the way to our national salvation. Please convey my warmest greetings to all the officers and men under you and accept same yourself. May God bless you and crown your efforts with success.

"Jai Hind."

(Sd.) Subhash Chandra Bose.

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Exhibit 'PPP'

Secret

Unit No. 450,

Burma, 18th March, 1945.

To

Unit No. 531.

Subject :—*Battle Report No 4.*

Ref : attached Sketch.

As per operation Order No 8. of 14th March 1945, of Unit No.450 timed 2037 hours, Unit No. 451 was occupying a defensive position on 11th March 1945 as under :—

A company commanded by Lieut. Kartar Singh in *Nglaing* vicinity. and 'B' Coy. commanded by 2/Lt. Gian Singh on North-East of *Kanzaung*, with Bn. Head-

quarters South of ' B ' Coy., near a Nippon Coy. commanded by Capt. *Midori Kawa*.

At 0100 hrs. enemy artillery from North-Western direction started shelling heavily these positions. At that time a patrol from ' A ' Coy. commanded by Hav. Nazar Singh, was out in the direction of *Nyaungu* about one mile ahead of Coy. Headquarters. This patrol was fired at by an enemy about a platoon strong coming from *Nyaungu* direction on the Western side of the main road.

Our Patrol took up position at point ' A ' and exchanged fire, thereby killing seven of the enemy. A message from this patrol was sent back to Coy. Headquarters as to the enemy advance. ' A ' Coy. Commander sent forward another party of 10 men under 2/Lt. Dittu Ram to check the advance of that platoon, 2/Lt. Dittu Ram went forward and took up a position between the road and ' A ' point, *i.e.*, point ' B. ' He was also engaged and the enemy was held up.

At about 12.0 hours, 15 enemy tanks, 11 armoured cars and ten trucks came advancing by the main road, and started shelling and firing at point ' A '. Our men replied this fire with rifle and a Bren Gun. The enemy column changed its direction towards ' B ' Coy., and then to ' A ' Coy.

' B ' Coy. was given warning by the Bn. Headquarters through a runner. Soon the Coy. gained contact as the enemy A. F. Vs. came right into the Coy's locality and wanted to crush our men in the trenches. They started

shelling and throwing hand grenades into the trenches from inside their vehicles. The Coy. fell helpless against the superiorly equipped enemy. Two mines which were with the Coy. were used but unluckily both went missed. No. 5. and 6. platoons got out of the trenches and with Bayonets fixed charged on to the A. F. Vs. with shouting slogans of *Neta ji ki jai, Inqilab Zindabad* and *Chalo Delhi.*" The A. F. Vs. came to a stand still, enemy jumped out of them and the truck and a hand to hand fighting began which lasted for over one hour. 2/Lt. Gian Singh, Coy. Comdr. amidst men, was charging and inspiring them. No. 5 platoon Commander, his 2/Lt. Mangu Ram was killed and only about one-tenth of the two platoons were left when 2/Lt. Gian Singh called for No. 4 platoon Commander 2/Lt. Ram Singh, and was, issuing orders for a withdrawal from a standing position, when a bullet hit him in the head and he fell down. His death caused a little bit disturbance but 2/Lt. Ram Singh got hold of the situation by withdrawing the remnants of the Coy. to a rear position. At the same time the enemy also got into their vehicles after collecting weapons of the dead and withdrew. This engagement lasted from 1400 hours to 1600 hours approximately. The enemy lost about 50 killed and many wounded. We lost about 40 killed. Some of the seriously wounded—about ten—were captured by the enemy and taken back.

The enemy which had come towards A Coy. side, started first by shelling the village and then approached

the Coy. position. The A. F. Vs. entered the village. Enemy automatic from the ground also opened fire. Fire was also opened from our Coy. At about 1800 hrs the enemy charged with bayonets and tommy guns. The Japanese set the village on fire thus making it a tank obstacle. The tanks could not approach and the enemy had to withdraw leaving back three dead. 'A' Coy. also lost three killed.

Towards the dark TAUNGZIN was still in our hands and the enemy withdrew. 'B' unit 551 then came back to a position near KWEBYOK for reorganization.

Only following articles were captured from the enemy.

Mag. Bren Gun	...	...	3
Hands Grenades	...	...	8
Amm 303" Rds.	...	...	100
Boot ankle Prs.	...	...	3
Trousers Prs.	...	...	3
Pay book	...	...	1 (attd. here with.)

*Note.*—One L. M. G., one Tommy Gun and a Rifle fell to Japanese lot.

Our losses were :—

*Killed in Action.*

2/Lt. Gian Singh | Regarding these two officers, I strongly  
 ,, Mangu Ram | ly recommend for a posthumous  
 reward and decorations. Their  
 bravery is unparalleled in the history  
 of War. Attacking of tanks and

A F. Vs. may seem impossible, had these heroes, preferred to die fighting than to hands up or show their backs.

*Other ranks killed,*

Number about 50. A separate list is being submitted. Wounded in action and thus captured about ten, wounded brought back six.

The arms of our killed could not be collected as the enemy collected it and took back.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,

Encls. One Pay Book. Maj. Comdr. No. 450 Unit.  
One sketch.

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Exhibit 'QQQ'

Burma,  
20th March, 1945.

Beloved Nataji,

Jai Hind,

I have received your letter of the 12th March 1945. Not words, only tears could express my feelings.

I thank you with all my heart for expressing your complete confidence in me and in those who are with me. I assure you, our Netaji, on behalf of the Regiment that does not matter what may come in our way, we will continue the struggle according to your ideals and wishes to earn our Mother-Land's Freedom as long as a single soldier of this regiment is alive.

As for myself, my last words to you, at Rangoon, "Main ap ki ankhen kisi ke samne nichhi na hone dunga," have been ringing in my ears ever since I left you, and specially so after I have come back from NYAUNGW. I fully realize that in spite of reason, which may be produced, I have not only failed to do what I voluntarily promised, but have been the only regimental Commander to bring humiliation to you and to the Azad Hind Fauj. I have no face to promise again, only my action will do so.

Your letter has put a new spirit into us.

All the officers and men present here, and I, humbly and with warmest hearts have accepted your greetings. We are confident that God's grace and your blessings it will not be difficult to achieve success.

We all pray for your long life and health to guide us through this Holy War.

Jai Hind.

Your Excellency's obediently  
(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon.

### Exhibit 'RRR'

*Secret.*

Unit No. 450,

Battle Report No. 5. Burma, dated 25th March, 1945.

Since the submission of the last report No—4 of 18th March 05, nothing of importance has happened, though the patrol activities on both sides have been on the increase. Some of the points noticed are reported below for the sake of interest and training :—

1. During these days who have been sharing the occupation of most of the places in our area with the enemy, we would occupy during the night and they during the day as if a definite settlement existed between the two.

2. Many a place have we attacked during the night only to find that there was no enemy.

3. Many a time our patrols were seen by the enemy patrols or vice versa and firing started on both sides mostly from long ranges.

One day, *i. e.* 20th March 05, at about 1600 hrs, an enemy patrol about fifty strong came in front of the dispositions of 'A' coy. 452 unit. Timely warning was given by the forward listening posts and our Coy. Comdr. Lt Ram Nath sent forward two platoons to encircle the enemy. Before this could be done the enemy started running back. Our men ran after him for about two miles as if chasing a game during peace time. The Coy. and Pl. Comdrs. tried their best to collect the two platoons, but men would not listen. Most of these men were civilian recruits from Malaya. The enemy was firing back at our men, but our men would not take to the ground, instead they said "Oe, bat to sun Jao." It was after about two hours that our Commanders could collect all the men. When told that you should not do like this and must make use of the ground—our men said, 'Sahib ham Kia Karen, dushman to rukta hi nahin hai, bhage chala jata hai' This story shows a grand spirit, but poor training.

4. It was learnt from the Japanese M. P. that the



villagers round about PONGO BIN informed that on the days following our attacks on Hill 1860, the enemy took back 3 full lorry loads of the dead. Of couers wounded must be more.

5. It has also been learnt that the enemy troops take away women from the nearby villages, west of TAUNGIN Hills by force, keep them for a day or so and then send them back. Rape cases being so frequent that the villagers are getting anti-British. This is another point where the enemy cannot defeat us for he may give them food stuffs, but honour cannot be compensated by anything and the Burmese people are very touchy as far as self-respect is concerned.

*On 21st March 05.*

Our positions of Unit No. 453 were disclosed to the enemy by a Burme Spy, and thus were heavily shelled, bombed, mortar fired and machine gunned, for about four hours during the afternoon. The result was, one man 2/Nk Sudarshan was so slightly wounded that even his evacuation was not necessary. This is a proof of taking to the cover.

7. Pooling the necessity of more training, it is being arranged by these H. Qrs. to issue "Training Notes During War" upto platoons within this unit. A copy of Note No. 1. is attached herewith.

As a result of this race, we got three 2" Martor, bombs and one rifle magazine with nine rounds, which the

enemy had to leave back to lighten the load or due to nervousness.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,

Major,

Commander No. 450 Unit A. H. F.

*Distribution.*

531 Unit (2), (1) to each Bn.

War Diary (1), office Copy (1).

---

Exhibit "SSS"

Unit No. 170.

Most secret.

Operation order No 2.

Copy No 3.

Ref :— Verbal orders issued on 24th February, 1945.  
Map Sheet No. K. P. O. L. 1" 1"=125,000.

1. *Information :—*

(a) *Enemy :—* Enemy Infantry and armoured troops have captured Pyinbin and elements of the same have been reported in Seiktein and Legy and Kyauk Padaung Myingyan road. But this report is not confirmed.

(b) *Own Tps :—* Our E. of the Khajo Botai has taken up position Kyauk Padaung Myingyan road in Gyaingywa. One Bn. of the same unit is going to take up the defence of *Kyauk Padaung*. Unit No. 205, A.H.F. is preparing Popa defences and strengthening up the same, apart from patrol activities in its front and flanks.

2. *Intention :—*

No. 170 Unit will carry out intensive Grila. warfare and patrolling against the enemy in the areas marked in the attached map.

### 3. *Method*:—

(a) No. 2. Bn. with Kyauk Padaung as base will operate in No. 1 area and will also send a fighting patrol along the route marked on the Map to find out the type, location and activities of enemy. The patrol on finding out will report straight back to No. 251 Unit.

(b) No. 1 Bn. will form a Guerrilla Company, No. 3 Bn. will also form a Guerrilla Company. These companies with Popa as base will operate in areas 2 and 3.

(c) Regimental Headquarters and rest of the un-equipped strength of 1 and 3 Bns. will also move to Popa and will help in preparation of defences there.

### 4. *Administration* :—

Seven days ration will be taken by the outgoing parties. Each Guerrilla party will be accompanied by orderlies, who will carry with them necessary medicine. A. Q. M. will have hundred grenades from 265 unit. Rs. 1000 will be taken by each party for purchase of fresh rations or to meet any unforeseen necessities, and issue fifty each to No. 1 to 3 Bns.

### 5. *Inter-Communications*:—

Under all circumstances during the absence from parties will send back necessary information at least once a day or more, if needed.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,  
Major,

Commander 170 Unit.

#### *Distribution:*

One copy to each Bn. 173 Unit.

One copy to Unit No. 251.

One office copy.

Exhibit "TTT"

No. D. 5.

Dated 2nd April, 1945.

To

Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan.

From

Lt. Col. G. S. Dhillon.

Captain Mohammad Hussain's absence has not effected the spirit or morale of the troops at all. We are prepared to continue fighting in the front line. No need of rest unless objective is achieved. We will sacrifice our lives to maintain the honour of Azad Hind Fauj. Water or no water, rations or no rations will not effect our fighting capacity. Captain Chander Bhan, Lieut. Khan Mohammad and Lieut. Kartar Singh along with my staff, join me in assuring you that we will fight up to the last.

Jai Hind.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,

Lt. Colonel.

Commander, 450 Unit. A.H.F.

Time 2105 hours.

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Exhibit "UUU"

*The charge of the immortals.*

It was a flat stretch of land without any cover either from view or from fire, except a shallow dry pond near which there roads of great tactical importance meet. Four miles North-west of this point was a Hill 1423 feet high behind which the enemy Artillery was located so as to cover the road junction and the area south of it, the occupation of which would effect the entire plan of operations.

At a key point like this was placed a company of Azad Hind Fauj under the command of 2/Lt. Gian Singh Bisht, trained at the Officers Training School, Azad Hind Fauj. The company was only Ninety-eight strong. They had no Machine guns or even Light Machine Guns. Good old Rifles were their only weapon of defence or offence apart from two A/TK. Mines. Their orders were to check any enemy advance at all costs.

They remained in that position for two days, but the enemy dare not advance. Then on 16th of March 1945, starting early morning hostile Fighting Planes bombed and Machine gunned their positions until about 11 A.M. Having got rid of all the load they had, aeroplanes went away.

Then the enemy Guns from behind the Hill started registering, and behind this barrage of Artillery fire advanced a column of motorised Infantry consisting of 13 tanks, 11 armoured cars and 70 trucks. Half of this column made its way straight towards the pond where two Forward Platoons of the company were in positions. Load and explosives were being thrown out of the Armoured Fighting Vehicles, but this would not frighten our boys, they waited in their trenches for the infantry to debuss. Tanks and armoured cars like steel monsters creating hell with their fire power approached so close that they started charging on to our trenches so as to crush and cripple our men under their heavy weight. Two mines were thrown in their way which unluckily did not burst, but they caused monsters to stop which having stopped became stationery pill boxes oozing out most inhuman forms of killing materials.

There was no communication between this post and the Battalion H. Qrs. when 2/Lieut. Gian Singh appreciated, that their Rifles fire was no match to the enemy's Mortars, Machine Guns, Light Automatics and Hand Grenades and their staying in trenches meant certain death or captivity with no loss to the enemy, he ordered, "Charge." Leading the assault he shouted slogans of "Netaji ki Jai" "Inqalab Zindabad," "Azad Hindustan Zindabad" and "Chalo Delhi." All the men responded to slogans which echoed above the enemy fire. This was the only support which these heroes had against the superior armament of the enemy. In the name of India and *Indian Independence*, they charged into the *Enemy* trucks. The enemy immediately debussed. Hand to hand fighting ensued which lasted for full two hours, but our heroes would not give in, forty of them sacrificed their

lives after killing more than their equal number of the enemy. Their unconquerable spirit harassed the enemy so much that he started retreating.

Just then, 2/Lieut. Gian Singh called forward his third Platoon Commander 2/Lieut. Ran Singh, was giving out orders when a bullet struck on his head and he fell down never to give out orders again. 2/Lieut. Ran Singh then collected the remnants of the company and re-organized.

2/Lieut. Gian Singh Bisht used to tell his men that he would die with them, he fulfilled his promise and remained their comrade in life and death. This was a glorious deed, of which the History will remain witness as long as there is world. 2/Lieut. Gian Singh and his men lived up to the ideals of our great Leader—the {Netaji—and have laid down their lives fighting by their posts to build up a tradition for us to follow. In FREE India the spirit of these Heroes, who knew no defeat, will be worshipped for generations to come and will inspire the future sons of India to live up to such high ideals.

(Sd.) G. S. Dhillon,  
Lt. Col.

Dated 9th April, 1945.

Commander 801 Unit.

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Exhibit "XXX"

*Indian National Army Administrative instructions.*

by

*Executive Committee*

*Indian National Army.*

*Saturday*

Syonan—To

20th February, 1943.

Appointments.

4. Appointments as per attached list have been made subject to the approval of the President, Council of Action.

M. Z. Kiani., Lt. Col.  
Executive Committee.

*Annexure to I. N. A. Administration No. 4.*


*Dated 21st February, 1943.*


*Director of Military Department.*

*Lt.-Col. S. K. Bhonsle.*

*A. D. C.*

*Lt. Mirza Inayat Ali.*





**Exhibit 'YYY'**

*Bureau Orders.*

by .

*Lieut.-Col. J. K. Bhonsle*

*Director of Military Bureau I. I. L*

Syonan—To

Dated 14th May, 2603.

71.

Number of the year.

With effect from the date of receipt of this order the number of the year will be in accordance with the Nippon calender, that is, 1943 will be shown 2603, and so on.



In future Nippon year will be shown on all official correspondence and documents.

C. J. STRACEY, Lieut.-Col.  
Chief Administrator, D. M. B., I. I. L.

Exhibit 'ZZZ'

*Azad Hind Fauj (I. N. A.) Gazette.*

"Security."

No. A/22.

Dated 2nd November, 2603.

Serial No. 104.

Posting and Transfers.

The following posting and transfers are made :—

Rank	Name	From	To	w. e. f.
	Shah Nawaz H. Qrs.	No. 1 Grla.	12th October,	
Lt Col.	Khan.	Supreme Regt.	2603.	
		Comd.	P. K. Sahgal,	
			Major,	
			Military Secretary.	

